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2 Properties of Property: A Jurisprudential Analysis
“It is not wrong to say that the nature and intent of a 
society reveal themselves in the legal and customary 
concepts of property held by the various members 
and classes of that society. These property concepts 
do not change without an incipient or fundamental 
change in the nature of the society itself. The history 
of property relations in a given society is thus, in a 
way, the history of the society itself .” (Schurmann 
1956: 507) 
“No doubt the eighteenth century preferred rational 
treaties  expounding  the  theory of  property  to 
historical essays describing the theories of property. 
But … we … know that the institution of property 
has had its history and that that history has not yet 
come to an end … We begin with the knowledge 
that there must be as many theories of property as 
there  have  been  systems  of  property  rights. 
Consequently  we  abandon the  search  for  the  true 
theory of property and study the theories of the past 
ages.  Only  thus  can  we learn  how to  construct  a 
theory suitable to our own circumstances” (Schlatter 
1951: 10).
2.1 Introduction: sovereigns, commoners and the state we are   
in.
In this chapter I provide the reader with a framework that enables 
an analytical understanding of property. I argue that property is 
normative  protocols  structuring  social  relations  with  regard  to 
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things  (that  is,  property  relations).  Given  that  there  are,  in 
practice, no social relations that do not involve things of some 
kind as their setting or as their props, property is of fundamental 
importance  to  the  way  in  which  societies,  and  other  social 
groups,  are  organised.  Property  protocols  refer  to  customs, 
norms,  and  conventions  guiding  people's  behaviour.  These 
protocols (often understood as patterns of duties, rights, powers, 
privileges and so on) define certain freedoms or limitations with 
regard to who may do what with any given thing or resource.
2.1.1 Private property and commoning under one umbrella.
The most well-known and widespread configuration of property 
is  private  property,  which,  of  course,  characterises  capitalist 
democracy. Private property is a particular property protocol that 
is  generally  understood as  giving  rise  to  social  relations  with 
regards  to  things  that  are  paradigmatically  different  from  the 
social relations with regard to things that  I have referred to as 
commoning, following Linebaugh and De Angelis. 
While it is uncontroversial to define property as social relations 
with regard to things, philosophical or legal accounts of property 
do  not  normally  account  for  commoning  as property.  The 
commons is seen as the paradigmatic non-property case. Yet both 
commoning  and  private  property  concern  the  same  subject 
matter:  how we relate to each other with regard to things and 
with regard to  the  rest  of  the world.  Who has  access to what  
resource, what are those with access allowed to use the resource 
for, who takes responsibility for the resource, what happens to 
the wealth that  can be generated from the resources,  who can 
sell,  buy  or  otherwise  transfer  the  privilege  of  access  to  a 
resource and its wealth effects, who makes the decisions about 
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these things, how are the decision-making processes organised in 
cases where more than one individual holds the decision-making 
authority  and,  finally,  with reference  to  what  values  are  these 
decisions legitimised? 
Once  we  uncover  the  elements  which  both  share,  these  two 
different  kinds of  property can be brought together  under one 
analytical umbrella. The purpose is to reveal the way in which 
each of them functions and the different kinds of social relations 
that they give rise to. In this way the applicability of either of the 
two in a given context – for instance a particular resource or class 
of  objects  –  can be assessed on the same terms.  A normative 
evaluation can start from there.
Because  property  in  general  has  come  to  be  understood  as 
synonymous with private property, the way in which analysts are 
able to think about property has been greatly limited. By opening 
up  the  analytical  framework  of  property  to  include  at  once 
commoning  and private  property,  both  will  be  seen  in  a  new 
light.  Moreover,  given  the  anti-capitalist  starting  point  of  the 
essay, understanding commoning in the same terms as property 
can  better  facilitate  a  transfer  of  land,  its  resources,  and  the 
means of production and distribution, from being organised with 
private property rights  to  become organised through modes of 
commoning.
It should here be noted that I am in no way arguing that private  
property should be done away with, rather I am hoping to reveal 
its  anatomy, so that  we may assess its usefulness for different 
purposes and in different domains. While the idea is to better be 
able  to  limit  its  range,  my account  of  property should not  be 
understood  as  a  normative  exercise.  While  I  point  to  certain 
normative implications throughout my discussion, it  is  not my 
primary  objective  to  provide  a  thorough  moral  analysis  of 
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property.  Many  of  these  have  been  provided  by  others  more 
skilled in such matters. Rather, I will address the way in which 
property  is  understood  to  function  in  liberal  jurisprudence. 
Specifically,  I  will  draw  upon  James  Harris’s  work,  whose 
analytical approach and framework describes with most accuracy 
the  way  in  which  the  institution  of  property  in  capitalist 
democracy  functions  legally  as  well  as  economically.  His 
account is consistent with, and indeed clarifies, many preceding 
accounts of property in liberal  jurisprudence on the one hand, 
and  on  the  other,  economic   policy  which  implements  and 
regulates property.
2.1.2 The little king of private property.
Property,  it  is  generally  argued,  distributes  decision-making 
authority regarding the use of resources. Private property, as we 
shall  see,  distributes  this  authority  to  individuals  and  quasi-
individuals such as firms and associations, granting them open-
ended powers and privileges with regard to the use of certain 
resources,  and  legitimising  what  Harris  calls  their  self-
seekingness in this regard.
Public  policy  discourse  has  become  saturated  with  economic 
reasoning30, and it is taken for granted that the primary, if not the 
only  purpose  of  property  is  the  satisfaction  of  individual 
preferences  through the market.  The sole  function of  property 
rights  has  seemingly  become  the  “guiding  [of]  incentives  to 
achieve a greater internalization of externalities” (Demsetz 1967: 
347). That is, property rights are thought to maximise aggregate 
30 The law-and-economics movement has been traced back to Ronald Coase’s 
influential 1961 article ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (Posner 1983).
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social wealth by encouraging people to calculate the costs and 
benefits of owning things. Underlying the economic approach to 
property  rights  is  that  “the  costs  and  benefits  of  a  person’s 
activity should rebound on him (as far as possible), and only on 
him (as far as possible)” (Reeve 1986: 25). 
What on an economistic account is the main purpose of property 
–  satisfaction  of  preferences  –  is  for  Harris  the  logical 
presupposition on which all  property institutions are built. The 
institution  of  property  presupposes  the  notion  of  open-ended 
powers and privileges which people have over things, and which 
authorise the pursuit of ends that are entirely justified simply by 
virtue  of  being  theirs.  It  is  not  that  Harris  agrees  that  self-
seekingness, the pursuit of self-interest, is the only motivational 
factor for agency,  nor that it  is  necessarily the primary one in 
social or psychological terms. What Harris  does say is that the 
operation  of  property  within  the  law  proceeds from  the 
conception of property as open-ended power, and the view of the 
individual as sovereign. In actually existing property systems, of 
course, Harris recognises, these open-ended powers are always 
also limited:  their  range is  not  absolute.  Nonetheless,  it  is  the 
vision of the individual sovereign, the little king, that is at the 
heart of the dominant conception of private property as instituted 
in capitalist democracy. 
What I call “economistic” refers to the science of economics that 
has  been  “detached”  from  further  moral,  political  and  social 
discussion (Sayer 1999). For what  does concern moral, political 
and social questions, the economistic approach to policy assumes 
the  moral  and  political  priority  of  the  individual  over  the 
community; the subjectivities of values (values as preferences); 
and  the  market  as  the  primary  mechanism  for  mediating 
individual preferences within society.
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Sharing, on this view, leads to tragedy. 
2.1.3 The  distribution  of  care  and  the  tragedy  of  the 
commons.
The Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968) is a story that has 
been much debated since its publication, but the terrain that it 
covers is not  new. It  can be traced back to the distribution of 
care, a philosophical concept first  introduced by Aristotle.  The 
distribution of care concerns who takes care of what and how 
with regard to goods and resources. For Aristotle, care would be 
most  adequately administered if  distributed to  individuals,  not 
managed  in  commons.  He  took  note  of  "how  immeasurably 
greater” the pleasure is, “when a man feels a thing to be his own” 
(Aristotle, Politics, Book 2, Part 5). Accordingly, he did not have 
great sympathy for commons:
"What is common to the greatest  number gets the 
least  amount  of  care.  Men  pay  most  attention  to 
what  is  their  own;  they  care  less  for  what  is 
common; or at any rate they care for it only to the 
extent  to  which  each  is  individually  concerned. 
Even when there is no other cause for inattention, 
men are more prone to neglect their duty when they 
think  that  another  is  attending  to  it"  (Aristotle, 
Politics, Book 2, Part 3).
The story of the tragedy of the commons runs along similar lines. 
It  was  communicated  through  the  imagined  organisation  of  a 
fictitious  pasture:  if  a  group  of  herders  owns  a  pasture  in 
common, to which access is “open and free”, there is no reason 
for each of the herders not to expand their herd. And if there is no 
143
thecommoner :: issue 14 :: winter 2010
reason not to expand, they will do so - at least so the story goes - 
soon leaving them all  with too little  grass and space for their  
respective herds. The result is that the pasture becomes overused, 
and hence all the herders suffer: a tragic breakdown and collapse 
of natural resources. Moreover, if the pasture is shared between 
all, it opens the possibility of individual herders free-riding on 
the work of others. Of course such concerns also apply to the 
intangible  realm,  since  complex  computer  programmes, 
encyclopaedias,  journals  and  large-scale  scientific  quests  in 
general,  require  a  successful  distribution  of  care,  just  like 
pastures. 
If,  however,  the  pasture  is  split  up into exclusive parcels,  the 
herders will each manage their respective parcel in a sustainable 
manner  according  to  their  own  self-interest.  According  to  the 
logic  of  the  market,  then,  whoever  cannot  handle  their  parcel 
profitably will be bought out by one of the others, who has been 
handling his own parcel so successfully that he has accumulated 
an excess of wealth with which he can buy out his competitor 
(and subsequently - quite possibly - employ him on the basis of 
wage relations to do the exact same kind of work, but for less 
return and without the joy associated with ownership, as stated in 
the Aristotelian premise). 
Looking  at  the  story  of  the  tragic  commons  from a  different 
perspective,  however,  we  may  say  that  the  herders  would  be 
better off sharing a pasture in common, since the rain, the wind 
and the sun do not obey human property laws. Hence the rain 
may fall, the wind may blow, and the sun may shine unevenly 
and consequently there would be a need to be able to move the 
herds around in a manner more flexible than what is afforded by 
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splitting the pasture up into exclusively owned parcels31. In other 
words, overuse is just one of many possible outcomes to be taken 
into account in the organisation of a common pasture. Moreover, 
the  Aristotelian  premise  that  distribution  of  care  is  better 
achieved when people have a sense of ownership hardly helps to 
make the case for a system that concentrates ownership in the 
hands  of  the  few  and  renders  the  many  employees  –  or 
unemployed.
Hardin’s tragic story is not the only one of its kind and certainly 
nothing  new32.  Hardin  complemented  Mancur  Olson’s  “The 
Logic  of  Collective  Action”  (1965)  which  reiterates  the 
Hobbesian  proposition  that  individuals  are  self-interested  and 
will  not,  unless  there  is  an  external,  coercive  mechanism, 
produce common goods or achieve collective ends. Olson’s and 
Hardin’s  justifications  for  a  market  economy  and  a  central 
authority with powers of coercion are both structured according 
to  what  is  known  in  game  theory  as  an  n-person  prisoners' 
dilemma  (Dawes  1973),  and  have  long  been  refuted  through 
many empirical examples (see next section) and on purely logical 
grounds (especially Taylor 1976, 1982, 1987; Ostrom in Baden 
and Noonan (eds.) 1998). The assumptions of the tragedy of the 
commons,  however,  run  deep.  The  phenomenon  of  Free 
Software,  for  example,  has been called “the impossible public 
31 The obvious reply from the privatiser to this is that such re-distribution of 
rain and sun can be solved by private contracts, but the question for the 
community  of  herders  practising  their  customs  in  common  would  still 
remain: why split up the pasture in the first place?
32 Ostrom notes: “In 1833,  William Forster Lloyd sketched a theory of the 
commons that predicted improvident use for property owned in common. 
More  than  a  decade  before  Hardin's  article,  H.  Scott  Gordon  clearly 
expounded a similar logic in another classic, “The Economic Theory of a 
Common-Property Research: The Fishery”” (Ostrom in Baden and Noonan 
(eds.) 1998: 96.)
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good” (Smith and Kollock 1999). Cooperation and commoning 
are still assumed to be unlikely beyond the market and the reach 
of  a  coercive  authority.  And  care  is  still  thought  of  as  best  
distributed by enthroning little monarchs with each their private 
property  realms,  despite  plenty  of  evidence  that,  while  care 
might coincide with self-interest or other private purposes, it very 
well might not.
2.1.4 Commons in the world.
Elinor Ostrom, beginning with her doctoral field work in the mid 
1960s (but see particularly Ostrom 1990, 2000) has unpacked the 
Tragedy of the Commons empirically, and thereby challenged the 
conventional wisdom that common property is poorly managed 
and should be either regulated by central authorities or privatised
33.  By  investigating  real-life  commons,  such  as  fish  stocks, 
pastures,  woods,  lakes,  and  groundwater  basins,  which people 
have  sometimes  for  over  centuries  managed  and  cared  for  in 
common, Ostrom has shown that:
“...there is no reason to think that the only forms of 
resource  governance  must  come  from  individual 
ownership  on  the  one  hand,  or  from  central 
governmental  management  on  the  other  … 
communities  clearly  refute  the  idea  that  the 
commons is necessarily "tragic"” (Rose 2003: 106).
33 For her  trail-blazing work to reinstate the validity of  the commons as  a 
strategy  for  managing  natural  resources,  Ostrom was  awarded  the  2009 
Nobel  Prize  in  Economic  Sciences  (The  Royal  Swedish  Academy  of 
Sciences 2009).
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Instead of corroborating the idea that human beings are naturally 
self-interested  and  therefore  must  be  coerced  to  cooperate, 
Ostrom points  to future areas of  research to  better  understand 
how resources can be shared. Drawing on her research findings, 
she confirms that free-riding is a problem, she admits that some 
people do indeed seem to not naturally cooperate, but that, also, 
many people happily cooperate on a voluntary basis. 
The real tragedy of the commons, then, is their enclosure, that is 
the destruction of commons by privatising forces. After all, “[t]he 
commons  did  not  collapse,  they  were  “stolen,”  as  common 
sentiment at that time expressed it” (Siefkes 2009). 
Crucially, contrary to Hardin's fiction, the sharing of a pasture in 
real  life  happens  in  community.  Open-access  commons,  of 
Hardin’s  tragic kind,  are  governed by only one rule:  anything 
goes.34 Anyone with access to the resource can take from and do 
with  it  what  they  will.  Most  existing  commons,  however,  are 
highly structured commons with a set of principles, rules, norms 
and, in general, specific ways of living together in order  not to 
face  a  tragedy.  These  community-defined  rules  and  principles 
have developed over time through cooperation and in the case of 
natural  resources,  observations  of  the  land.  Communities 
structure commons and commons structure communities. As De 
Angelis notes:
34 Hardin later admitted his original conflation of open-access commons with 
structured ones in personal communication with John A. Baden (Baden and 
Noonan (eds.)  1998:  xvii).  However,  I  am here not  addressing Hardin’s 
personal intellectual development, but the continued force of his fiction in 
the context of public policy.
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“By assuming that commons are a free-for-all space 
from  which  competing  and  atomised  ‘economic 
men’  take  as  much  as  they  can,  Hardin  has 
engineered  a  justification  for  privatisation  of  the 
commons  space  rooted  in  an  alleged  natural 
necessity. Hardin forgets that there are no commons 
without community within which the modalities of 
access  to  common  resources  are  negotiated. 
Incidentally,  this  also  implies  that  there  is  no 
enclosure of commons without at the same time the 
destruction  and  fragmentation  of  communities” 
(2004: 58).
Rebuilding commons,  it  is  implied on that  view,  is  to  rebuild 
communities and vice versa: the rebuilding of communities is the 
rebuilding of commons. In Chapter 1 we discussed the problem 
of virtual commons detached from real commons becoming – if 
we follow the money – capitalist commons. When detached from 
real  commons,  the  virtual  commons  has  no  body  and  no 
connection  to  the  land  and  therefore,  crucially,  no  proper 
connection to social movements for whom access to and control 
over land as a means of subsistence and production are the most 
pressing  concerns  –  and  for  whom  a  virtual  commons  is 
meaningless without having land to put their feet on. 
Consider  the  Landless  Workers'  Movement  (MST)  in  Brazil, 
which counts more than a million people who collectively are 
challenging extreme inequalities: nearly half the land is owned 
by  just  over  1% of  the  population  (McNally  2006:  285).  The 
MST  have  clear  objectives  aiming  at  a  radical  social 
transformation:
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“We have three fences to cut down … the fence of 
the big estate, the fence of ignorance and the fence 
of capital … Our struggle is not only to win the land 
… We are building a new way of life” (quoted in 
ibid.)
Opposing the state and private interest is not a peaceful affair. At 
least 1,684 assassinations of landless workers took place between 
1964 and 1991 and MST activists  are  “regularly murdered by 
soldiers and military police” (ibid.). However, despite the nation 
state  and private  property  working  against  them,  stifling  their 
cooperation,  the  MST  has  carried  out  more  than  1200  land 
occupations, expropriated more than 50,000 square kilometres of 
land and established settlements for more than 100,000 families 
(ibid.). According to their slogan “Occupy, Resist, Produce”, the 
MST does not  advocate  individual  ownership of  land and the 
means of production, but supports cooperatives for agricultural 
production  and  factories,  which  handle  meat  storage,  milk 
packaging and coffee roasting. McNally writes:
“Once land is occupied, an MST encampment is set 
up  and  organized  democratically.  Decisions  are 
made  collectively  with  a  general  assembly 
constituting the highest decision-making body … It 
has  established  1,200  schools  and  operates  thirty 
radio stations. Finding that mainstream teachers are 
not  adequate  to  the  task  of  building  a  culture  of 
liberation, the MST has developed its own teacher 
training programs” (ibid.).
If  Free  Software  is  an  “impossible  public  good”,  which  only 
really  exists  because it  rides  on the surplus  of  capitalism and 
because  it  unfolds  in  the  intangible  realm where reproduction 
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costs are minimal and the rivalrousness of goods absent, then the 
achievements of the MST are approximating a miracle. Making 
sense of such social movements in philosophical, legal and social 
terms can  obviously  not  commence from a  starting  point  that 
entails the assumption that their achievements are impossible. In 
order  to  facilitate  the  work of  these social  movements  and to 
begin creating a jurisprudential framework that can be used for 
an articulation of their property relations – with a view to self-
legislation – we obviously need a different starting point. 
2.1.5 Learning from property.
My  starting  point  is  not  merely  that  sustained  cooperation, 
commons and community building are possible, but that they are 
essential. I maintain that commons continue to be under threat of 
enclosure. Privatisation of land, its resources and the means of 
production and distribution is relentless and noxious to people, 
their relations and the environment. The use and abuse of these 
resources  inevitably  implicate  everyone,  and  hence  decision-
making  powers  over  them  should  not  lie  exclusively  with 
individuals or, possibly worse, quasi-individuals whose pursuit of 
self-interest is authorised without further justification. 
But private property is also enabling. It licenses creativity and 
open-ended  agency,  potentially  free  from  the  interference  of 
other  individuals,  the  state  or  another  overarching  political 
authority. Private property goes hand in hand with the creation of 
a legal individual  whose rights are inviolable. It  sanctions life 
and liberty for an individual  whose agency and creativity are, 
potentially,  open-ended.  It  makes  a  person's  body  and  her 
creations her own. It defines the individual's realm, in which she 
can build her castle or tear it down – at least theoretically, for 
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those  who are  in  a  position  to  exercise  their  private  property 
rights. The question then arises, however, how big can the castle 
be? 
I believe that there are lessons to be learned in the examination of 
the particular configurations of private property: understanding 
private property and the way it functions is indispensable to any 
attempt to constrain its reach, transform, or indeed, dismantle it.  
As we shall see in Chapter 3, the Free Software commons is in 
fact  dependent  on  a  particular  version  of  private  property  – 
namely copyright – which it subverts to its own ends by using its 
power of decision-making to instantiate a commons that ensures 
reciprocity in perpetuity. As a property model, Free Software is 
grafted  onto  copyright,  using  the  power  of  its  enforcement 
mechanisms  to  ensure  certain  freedoms  for  all.  We  will 
understand  Free  Software  better,  when  we  understand  it  as 
property.  And  we  will  understand  property  better,  when  we 
understand it as including commons.
My discussion in this chapter will begin with a disentanglement 
of  property  in  general  and property  in  particular.  I  will  then 
explain in more detail the notion of property relations as relations 
between people with regard to things, and property protocols as 
those  normative  codes  that  structure  these  relations.  This  will 
give us the basic structure for developing a framework within 
which social relations with regard to things can be understood – 
be  they  structured  through  law  and  private  property  rules, 
through the emergent customs of commoning practices, or any 
other  property  system.  I  begin  with  three  variables  only:  the 
relating  subject; the  related-to  object;  and  the  relational  
modality, which is defined through property protocols. I examine 
the  relational  modality  of  private  property  relations  in  some 
detail, and show that it consists of several elements, which enable 
its  functions.  Changing  these  elements,  or  reconfiguring  the 
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specifications of private property even in only small ways, can 
lead to surprising transformations of the kind of community that 
this relational modality gives rise to. Next, I discuss the ways in 
which  common  property forms  are  usually  classified  and 
distinguished  from  private  property, which  shows  that the 
differences between different property forms are all differences 
in the configuration of, essentially, the same elements. Indeed, I  
conclude that  property protocols,  whichever  way they may be 
expressed, all provide answers to the question of who makes (or 
can make) decisions over the actions of people with regard to 
things, and by reference to what these decisions are legitimised. I 
then argue that it is through the articulation of property protocols 
that a commons self-constitutes. 
I hope to show that a property framework can be a useful toolbox 
for the commoner, as well as that by inscribing commoning onto 
the framework, new tools and  perspectives for property analyses 
become available more generally.
2.2 Property in general, property in particular.  
“The distinguishing feature  of  Communism is  not 
the abolition of property generally, but the abolition 
of bourgeois property” (The Communist Manifesto; 
emphasis added).
The  way in  which  the  term property is  often  used  and hence 
understood  is  as  an  object  or  a  collection  of  objects  under 
someone’s exclusive control: “your property” is the stuff that you 
own, and what you own you have very special rights over. “Get 
off  my  property”  shouts  the  landlord  at  stray  ramblers,  his 
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aggression warranted by his special, legally protected relation to 
the fenced-in ground on which he stands.
2.2.1 Absolute dominion.
Underlying  this  sort  of  understanding  is  the  conception  of 
ownership as absolute dominion, most unequivocally expressed 
by Blackstone in the eighteenth century: “that sole and despotic 
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external 
things of the world in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe” (1962: 2)35.
The  dominion  conception  of  ownership  has  its  roots  in  the 
classical Roman concept of dominium ex jure Quiritium which is 
often described as conferring absolute rights over the object of 
ownership to the owner. The best-known Roman law definition 
describes dominium as "the right to use and abuse [consume/use 
up]  one's  own  within  the  limits  of  the  law"  –  jus  utendi  et  
abutendi re sua quatenus iuris ratio patitur.  However, there is 
disagreement about whether this citation is correctly attributed to 
Roman law regarding property36, as well as about the extent to 
which  dominium in practice amounted to complete sovereignty 
over something, given that laws in ancient Rome regarding the 
resolution of conflicts over property were very complex.37 
35 However,  Frederick  Whelan  (1980)  has  shown  that  Blackstone’s 
Commentaries are  replete  with  examples  of  the  limitations  on  absolute 
ownership.
36 See Shael Herman's ‘The Uses and Abuses of Roman Texts’ (1981) for a 
revealing discussion regarding the supposed definition of dominium, tracing 
its most likely origin to Grotius, founder of the school of modern natural 
law, and a Justinian article on mandate – not property.
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Moreover,  even  during  Blackstone’s  era  “no  legal  system 
afforded protection to an unchecked dominion of a resource by 
an  owner”  (Christman  1994:  18).  In  fact,  it  is  questionable 
whether the notion of “sole despotic dominion” by someone over 
some  things  without  any  kind  of  state  intrusion  or  other 
limitations was ever instantiated to any significant degree in any 
system of law (Christman 1994). 
No matter, however, where exactly its roots are and how exactly 
it is realised in practice, the conception of property as absolute 
power of disposal is a forceful one that has made it into one of 
the  most  important  modern  liberal  documents  of  history,  the 
French Declaration of Rights of Man:
“The right of property is that which belongs to every 
citizen to enjoy and to dispose of his goods at his 
will.”38
The  dominion  conception,  while  rhetorically  very  powerful, 
invoking, as it does, deep-seated feelings regarding individuality, 
independence and power in the face of a world full of threats to a 
37 See Henry Maine (1861); Christman (1996); Duncan-Jones (1990). Lawson 
(1958) denies that absolute ownership was ever instantiated in any legal 
system. See also Dias (1976).
38 Herman  (1981:  676)  clarifies  the  link  between  property,  the  contract-
making individual and the state which we broached above: “A freedom with 
unspecified content, [property in the Declaration of Rights] conformed with 
a  post-feudal  image of  men as  free,  willing parties  to  a  social  contract, 
bargaining their way up and down an economic ladder. The interdependent 
ideas of contractual freedom and private ownership were logically anterior 
to the state,  itself  a pact  of so many free wills.  "The government  (was) 
instituted  to  guarantee  men  the  enjoyment  of  their  natural  and 
imprescriptible  rights,"  proclaimed the Declaration of  Rights  of  24 June 
1793.  Among  these  rights  were  liberty,  equality,  security  and  private 
property.”
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mortal  human  body  and  the  things  it  needs  or  wants,  is 
nonetheless  a  very  narrow  perspective  which  betrays  the 
multitude  of  property  relations  which  have  structured  and 
continue to structure social relations.
However, James Harris has forcefully argued that the notion of 
dominium (which he calls  “full-blooded ownership”)  underlies 
all  property  institutions,  in  fact  that  it  is  presupposed by  any 
property institution, as well as by any rules that set out to limit 
the realm of dominion. For Harris, even the different versions of 
common property (which we will encounter later) are all merely 
aberrations of the logically prior idea of dominium. Harris would 
nonetheless agree that in a lot of literature and ordinary parlance, 
property – a general term – is equated with private property – a 
particular configuration of property. We have seen this conflation 
at  play  the  discussion  of  Free  Software  and  Free  Culture  in 
Chapter  1.  Such  type-token  conflation  is  arguably  not  very 
surprising given the hegemonic character of private property in 
contemporary  economic  systems.  Most  accounts  and  legal 
articulations  of  private  property,  however,  do  not  actually 
institute  it  as  the  kind  of  absolute  sovereignty  that  dominium 
posits.  For  example,  property-limitation  rules,  according  to 
Harris,  characterise all  existing property systems (Harris 1996: 
33),  and  hence  constrain  the  absoluteness  of  dominion. 
Dominion, in reality, is not absolute, it is conditional.
That  is  to  say,  not  only  do  we  need  to  distinguish  between 
property in general and  property in particular, we also need to 
distinguish  between  the  different  kinds  of  configurations  of 
property that might be grouped under the term private. Absolute 
dominion might be one such configuration and its justification, if 
there should be any, is probably limited to a rather narrow class 
of  objects  which  we  might  term,  following  Margaret  Radin 
(1982), personal possessions.
155
thecommoner :: issue 14 :: winter 2010
2.2.2 The variation of property.
There is  an ancient  contrast  between “private” and “common” 
property.  Plato  conceived  of  his  ideal  republic  as  based  on 
common  property  arrangements,  while  Aristotle, as  we  have 
seen,  promoted  forms  of  private  property  as  a  better  way  of 
organising social relations. Since their time, many arguments for 
and against  private and common forms of property have been 
developed, hailed and ridiculed.
Clearly one of the major issues in political theory has been to 
identify and discuss the rival merits of private property on the 
one hand, and common (or public or state or collective property) 
on  the  other39.  This  is  hardly  surprising,  given  that,  whatever 
form  they  may  take,  property  institutions  are  fundamental  to 
social  life.  The  kinds  of  conceptions  and  rules  that  exist 
regarding property in any given society will structure the kinds of 
interactions  people  will  have,  the  kinds of  economic practices 
they will engage in, the kinds of production that will exist, the 
kinds of policy priorities that will be set, and the distribution of 
resources  that  will  take  place  –  in  brief,  property  relations 
constitute  communities.  Or,  in  the  words  of  Edwin  Hettinger: 
“Property institutions fundamentally shape a society” (Hettinger 
1989: 31). 
39 Some of the more important works in recent decades are C.B. Macpherson’s 
“Theory  of  Possessive  Individualism:  From  Hobbes  to  Locke”  (1962), 
which provoked many responses,  including a  renewed engagement  with 
seventeenth century philosophers’ views on property; and Robert Nozick’s 
“Anarchy,  State  and  Utopia”  (1974),  which  assumes  the  primacy  of 
individual  property  rights  and  which  led  to  critical  explorations  of  the 
justification of private property, including general analyses of justificatory 
arguments for and against private property (e.g. Becker 1977).
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Andrew Reeve has argued that thinking about property blurs the 
boundaries  between  the  idea  of  an  economic  system,  a  legal 
system and a political  system, by providing some of the most 
fundamental  connections between them all  (1986:  7).  Property 
connects  the  economic,  legal,  and  political  in  its  coding  of 
relations between people with regard to things. Humans dwell in 
a very material world, no matter how suffused it  may be with 
symbolisms, know-how, value and meaning. As human beings, 
we participate in and share this world in which the animate and 
inanimate,  the  human  and  non-human  intermingle  and 
interpenetrate.  But  how we share  and how we participate  can 
take a multitude of forms. Property is a central part of shaping 
these hows.
Despite being “ubiquitous and complex, socially important and 
controversial”,  property  is  also  “notoriously  elusive”  (Harris 
1996: 6). Writings in political philosophy dealing with property 
do not always refer to the same thing. As Waldron writes: “My 
suspicion is  that  talk of  'a  right  to property'  means something 
different in each case” (1988: 15).
Sometimes, property is envisioned as a simple relation between a 
person and a thing, and explored in terms of the justifications that 
exist for someone to have absolute dominion over a thing of the 
external  world.  Sometimes  it  is  envisioned  as  “a  social  cake 
capable of being sliced up in different ways” (Harris 1996: 6), 
and  investigated  in  terms  of  the  justifications  for  the  unequal 
distribution of the cake. Lawyers conceive of property differently 
than  moral  or  political  philosophers  who  again  work  with 
different conceptions than economists. There is, it seems, not one 
single correct meaning of the term “property”.
One  thing  is  for  sure,  however,  property  is  more  than  either 
private  or  common.  Neither  “private  property”  nor  “common 
157
thecommoner :: issue 14 :: winter 2010
property” have had stable meanings throughout different eras and 
areas.  Nor  has  one  conception  ever  prevailed  exclusively. 
Property  “...is  not  immutable  … but  … like  all  material  and 
intellectual phenomena, incessantly evolves and passes through a 
series of forms which differ, but are derived, from one another” 
(Lafargue 1975: 3). 
Apart from the countless normative works that have been written 
over the centuries and which expound in detail the advantages 
and disadvantages  of  any particular  manifestation  of  property, 
there exist  also a series of studies which explore the different 
historic manifestations of property as an institution in legal and 
political  thought  and  practice  (e.g.  Schlatter  1951;  Lafargue 
1975;  Alexander  1997).  But  to  acknowledge  the  historical 
variation in conceptions of property also: 
“...throws  up  the  problems  of  identifying  the 
significant  variation  in  institutions  and  ideas,  and 
relating the two, on the one hand; and of providing a 
general account of the features of property of which 
these  variants  are  examples  on  the  other”  (Reeve 
1986: 45).
In that sense, a general characterisation of property depends on 
how to identify different conceptions of property, and how many 
of them to recognise. 
A general account of property, for Reeve, should encompass all 
the particular instantiations of property as its variants. It should 
indicate what  might  vary amongst  the different conceptions of 
property, and thereby also what exactly a justification of property 
needs to address. However, 
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“All  attempts  in  the  history  of  theorizing  about 
property  to  provide  a  univocal  explication  of  the 
concept of ownership, applicable within all societies 
and to all  resources, have failed” (Harris 1996: 5; 
see also Honoré 1987).
It is a curious fact that the perhaps most central concept that is  
shared across the disciplinary boundaries of philosophy, law and 
political economy remains an unsolved puzzle. This is probably a 
testimony to its ubiquity: it is simply too wide a concept to pin 
down. As such, the fact that no univocal explication exists is not 
a call for a solution either. It is certainly not my ambition to here 
provide such an explication. 
I do, however, want to present a framework from within which 
property analyses of a wide range can be applied in a variety of  
settings. The settings that I am particularly concerned with are 
those  of  social  movements,  the  lived  realities  of  struggles  for 
redistribution of land, its resources, and the means of production 
and distribution. The application I imagine is the self-articulation 
of  needs,  desires,  aspirations,  affects  and  relational  modalities 
with regards to things, in the form of property protocols. In other 
words,  the  process  of  self-articulation,  that  is,  the  collective 
determination  of  property  protocols  which  structure  social 
relations with regard to things is also a process through which a 
community  autonomously  constitutes  itself.  From  an  anti-
capitalist  perspective  the  most  attractive  power  of  property,  it 
seems to me, is the power that some systems of property relations 
lend  people  to  self-legislate  and  thus  inscribe  a  community's 
values  and  priorities  upon  the  land  and  into  the  surrounding 
things.
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2.3 Property as social relations.  
To begin with, then, we need to overcome the idea that property 
is a simple person-thing relation that implies an absolute (or even 
conditional) entitlement:
“We often think of property as some version of 
entitlement to things: I have a right to this thing or 
that. In a more sophisticated version of property, of 
course, we see property as a way of defining our 
relationships with other people. On such versions, 
my right to this thing or that isn't about controlling 
the "thing" so much as it is about my relationship 
with you, and with everybody else in the world” 
(Rose 1993: 27-28)
2.3.1 Hohfeld’s matrix.
The more nuanced perspective can in great part be attributed to 
“a  pivotal  article”  (ibid:  42,  note  10)  by  Wesley  Newcomb 
Hohfeld  in  which  he  outlined  ‘Some  Fundamental  Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1913). However, 
because the work of Hohfeld stands as a milestone in the liberal 
and legal  positivist  traditions,  not  much -  if  any -  “politically 
radical” work has been built on his conceptions; indeed there is a 
general reluctance amongst anti-capitalists to engage with liberal 
jurisprudence, including structural analyses of property. This can 
be  taken  to  reflect  the  conflation  shared  across  the  political 
spectrum and in the public imagination that property in general is 
seen  as  equal  to  the  very  particular social  relations  that 
exclusive,  private  property  rights  give  rise  to.  Or, private  
property  rights,  particular  to  capitalism,  are  understood  as 
property in general. Writing on property often does not unpack a 
given instance of property properly, but for instance merely states 
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that “property is theft”. That is in itself a false reference, since 
Proudhon arguably was among the first to seriously analyse and 
unpack the  idea of  private  property,  which he did  not simply 
write off as theft (Waldron 1988)40.
Hohfeld’s important contribution to jurisprudence was a way of 
systematising  components  of  legal  reasoning.  His  analysis 
applies to property as one of the sub-systems of law. Hohfeld 
“expounded  the  lowest  common  denominators  of  the  law  by 
reference to two squares of correlations and opposition” (Harris 
1996: 120-121):
  Right                      Privilege 
  Duty                       No-right 
  Power                   Immunity
  Liability               Disability
Illustration 1: Hohfeld's matrix.
In this matrix there is  correlation (vertically) between right and 
duty,  between  privilege and  no-right,  between  power and 
liability and between  immunity and  disability; while there is an 
opposition (diagonally) between right and no-right, between duty 
and  privilege,  between  power and  disability,  and  between 
liability and  immunity. The top half of the squares refers to the 
entitlements that characterise jural relations, the bottom half to its 
40 It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss Proudhon's analytical work 
further, but Waldron (1988: 323-330) provides a good starting point for an 
understanding of Proudhon's analysis, which, to put it in very simple terms, 
for example takes not of the fact that: If a justification of private property is 
based on the idea that it is good and essential for a human being to have and 
to hold private property rights, then all human beings should have and hold 
such  private  property  rights,  unless  a  society  wittingly  wants  to  create 
inequalities.
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correlated  position.41 On  Hohfeld’s  account  of  jural  relations, 
each  such  relation  consists  of  four  basic  components:  (i)  the 
person or group of persons holding an entitlement (X); (ii) the 
person or group of persons occupying the position correlative to 
the entitlement (Y); (iii) the form of the relation (i.e. whether it  
is, say, a right-duty relation or a power-liability relation); (iv) and 
the content thereof (the specification of the right-duty relation). 
A  Hohfeldian  explication  of  proprietary  entitlements  would 
hence specify the content of such entitlements. That is, it would 
specify what Y must do or cannot do, and what X may do or can 
do.  With  regard  to  proprietary  entitlements,  any  suitable 
specification  would necessarily  refer  to  the  object  or  resource 
with regard to which X and Y have to behave in a certain way42. 
In that sense, the relation of primary importance is the relation 
between people (X and Y, you and me), even though this relation 
will  concern  things.  We  can  begin  to  understand  property 
relations as social relations between people – all people – with 
regard to any given thing. 
The  matrix  permits  us  to  understand  the  simple  dominion 
conception  –  the  vision  of  one  individual  having  absolute, 
legitimate control  over a thing – as implicating everyone else. 
41 Hohfeld was convinced that “if all more complex legal conceptions were 
reduced to combinations of these various bi-party relations, legal reasoning 
would  be  clarified,  fallacious  conceptualization  would  be  avoided,  and 
genuine normative choices made apparent” (Harris 1996: 121). 
42 Misreadings  of  Hohfeld  have  led  to  the  disaggregation  thesis  (most 
prominently developed by Grey 1980), in which property as a concept is  
rendered (legally) useless. Property “disintegrates” and leaves only rights-
duty relations between persons, the “owner” becomes invisible as emphasis 
is placed on different people having different rights with regard to the same 
resource (cf. the “bundle of rights” conception), thereby obscuring further 
the projection of the king into the sovereign individual.
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Our starting point  thus  becomes the web of  relations  between 
people, and the interrelated nature of their actions which always 
involve  objects,  things,  resources  as  either  settings  or  props. 
Hohfeld's  work  added  that  multi-lateral  dimension  to  liberal 
jurisprudence and thus raised awareness of the complexity of the 
social  relations  that  are  involved  in  any  given  instance  of 
property relations43. 
2.3.2 Social relations as starting point.
In a related context, yet with a different analytical approach, Sol 
Picciotto  takes  note  of  the  importance of  the  starting point  in 
analyses of property: “Property should be thought of in the first  
instance as social” (2003).
In  formulating  what  can  be  understood  as  a  general 
understanding of property relations, Irving Hallowell, following 
the versatile Huntington Cairns (1935) and Hohfeld, emphasises 
the  triadic character  of  the institution of property. In a classic 
anthropological  theory  essay  from 1955 Hallowell  writes:  “'A 
43 Hohfeld’s  matrix  has  served  as  an  inspiration  for  the  influential 
understanding of property in terms of a “bundle of rights” (Maine 1917; see 
also Becker 1977; Munzer 1990). Penner (1997) provides a critique of the 
“bundle of rights” conception), which simply refers to the aggregation of 
different rights and duties that make up an instance of property relations. 
That is, the bundle of rights idea highlights the different components that 
make up property such as  the right  to use,  dispose of,  inherit.  Different 
rights of the bundle might at different times be allocated to different persons 
(or  other  legal  entities).  The  rights  of  the  bundle  can  be  separated  and 
reassembled depending on circumstances, as we shall see in some detail in 
Section 2.5.  The bundle of rights understanding is derived directly from 
Hohfeld's matrix, as it refers to the correlations that can be composed from 
within Hohfeld's matrix or any modification thereof.
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owns  B  against  C',  where  C  represents  all  other  individuals” 
(Hallowell 1974: 239). The dominion conception of property, by 
contrast,  is  dyadic.  A dyadic  conception  of  property  would 
propound  that  A owns  B,  without  C  even  entering  into  the 
equation. The  difference  is  one  of  starting  point,  where  the 
dyadic conception fails to see that the notion of an entitlement 
logically implicates those whom it is an entitlement against.
The  triadic  understanding  as  a  starting  point  in  analyses  of 
property  relations  permits  a  more  thorough  understanding  of 
property relations in  general. It also facilitates and enhances an 
analysis of any given particular set of property relations within a 
specific  economic  system  or  culture,  such  as  capitalist 
democracy.
“If we wish to understand property as an institution 
in  any  society  our  primary  concern  must  be  an 
analysis of the pattern of rights, duties, privileges, 
powers,  etc.,  which  control  the  behavior  of 
individuals or groups in relation to one another and 
to the custody, possession, use, enjoyment, disposal, 
etc.,  of  various  classes  of  objects.  In  such  an 
undertaking we have to reckon with an exceedingly 
complex network of structural relations and a wide 
range  of  variables,  the  specific  pattern  or 
constellation  of  which  constitutes  the  structure  of 
property  as  a  social  institution  in  any  particular 
case.” (Hallowell 1974: 239)
Here we have the definition of property with which I would like 
to  start.  Property  relations,  on  this  view,  are  social  relations. 
These social relations make up and are shaped by a “pattern of 
rights, duties, privileges, powers, etc., which control the behavior 
of  individuals  or  groups in  relation to  one another  and to  the 
164
Properties of Property: A Jurisprudential Analysis
custody,  possession,  use,  enjoyment,  disposal,  etc.,  of  various 
classes of objects”. The etceteras of the definition might worry 
the analytic philosopher, but they open up the general concept of 
property to a wide variety of particular configurations. This open 
definition should not prove to be controversial. It is reflected in 
Jeremy  Waldron's  work  where  he  defines  property  as  “the 
concept of a system of rules governing access to and control of 
material resources” (Waldron 1988: 31). It is taken for granted in 
the elaborate frameworks that Andrew Reeve (1986), and John 
Christman (1994) present, as well as in discussions of intellectual 
property  rights,  such  as  Hettinger’s  “Justifying  Intellectual 
Property Rights” (1989). All start from a perspective of property 
as  social  relations  between  people  with  regard  to  things  – 
patterned by legal or customary protocols that guide behaviour.
As  already  mentioned,  Harris’s  authoritative  treatment  of 
property, however, argues that property protocols have distinctive 
features  without  which  they  might  still  be  protocols  guiding 
people’s behaviour with regard to things, but they would not be 
property protocols. It will be instructive to familiarise ourselves 
with Harris’s terminology and account at this point.
2.3.3 Property and non-property.
Property, according to Harris, has the dual function of governing 
the use of  things and of allocating “social  wealth”,  which for 
Harris refers to the total of those things and resources which are 
scarce,  that  is,  over  which  there  might  be  substantial  conflict 
regarding  their  use.  That  is,  property  functions  as  both  a 
mechanism for distributing use-privileges (and their concomitant 
wealth  effects,  about  which  more  later),  as  well  as  control-
powers (decision-making authority).  If  rights  of  property  only 
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conferred on the holder the right to use a resource as she liked 
but never the right to allow another to use it, then the dual nature 
of  the  function  of  typical  property  institutions  would  be  split 
(Harris 1996: 28). For Harris,  in property, use privileges come 
with control over uses made by others.
All property institutions (actual articulations of complex sets of 
property protocols into property systems or regimes), for Harris, 
are characterised by the twin notions of trespassory rules on the 
one hand, and the ownership spectrum on the other (Harris 1996: 
31-32).  The  ownership  spectrum is  made  up  of  a  set  of 
ownership interests,  which are best understood as the kinds of 
specifications  needed  to  make  sense  of  the  Hohfeldian  jural 
relation.  An  ownership  interest  will  specify  a  particular  use-
privilege  or  control-power.  Different  ownership  interests  may 
obtain for different people for the same resource. All ownership 
interests (i) specify a juridical relation between an owner and a 
resource, (ii) are open-ended, in that they do not specify exactly 
the  kind  of  uses  that  a  resource  may  be  put  to,  they  merely 
express  open-ended  privileges  and  powers,  and  (iii)  they 
authorise  the  pursuit  of  one’s  self-interest  on  part  of  the 
individual  or  group  owner.  It  is  the  open-endedness and 
authorised  self-seekingness of  ownership  interests  which  are 
crucial to Harris’s account. 
Trespassory rules are social norms that oblige every member of a 
society – apart from the individual or group of individuals that 
are  taken  to  have  the  kind  of  open-ended,  self-seeking 
relationship to a thing that ownership is – not to make use of the 
thing  in  question  without  the  latter’s  consent.  The  ownership 
spectrum  refers  to  those  open-ended  relationships  that  the 
trespassory rules presuppose and protect. 
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“Where trespassory protection runs out,  the owner 
cannot  dictate  uses.  Within  the  compass  of  that 
protection, his use-privileges and control-powers are 
inferred,  not  from  the  content  of  the  trespassory 
rules,  but  from  the  prevailing  conception  of  the 
ownership interest itself” (Harris 1996: 32).
Without the prevailing (and, so Harris,  prima facie) conception 
of  ownership interests  as open-ended and as authorising self-
seekingness,  no  talk  of  property  would  make  sense.  The 
limitations and constraints that are imposed on owners (such as 
expropriation  rules,  planning  and  environmental  regulations) 
presuppose  this  idea  of  dominion.  Normative  discussions  of 
property  which  seek  to  replace  private  property  regimes  with 
common  property  regimes  also  all  presuppose  this  notion  of 
dominion as the ultimate referent in regard to which they make 
their case for its dissolution in practice.
“Ownership  interests,  however  labeled in  law,  are 
among  the  organizing  ideas  through  which  social 
wealth is filtered. Social wealth confronts citizens as 
lumps over which open-ended privileges and powers 
obtain, not as packages of specified rights” (Harris 
1996: 138). 
It is the open-endedness of privileges and powers that is crucial 
to the concept of ownership, argues Harris. As the owner of an 
apple, I do not only have the right to eat my apple raw, and to eat 
it cooked, and to sell it and to give it away, that is, I am not the 
holder  of  a  package  of  specified  rights44.  Rather,  I  have  a 
44 As we shall see later, in a lot of liberal jurisprudence, ownership is often 
explained by reference to the idea of a “bundle of rights” which obtain to 
the owner (or is spread over several people).
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privilege  to  use  it  in  whichever  way  I  want:  I  can  eat  it  by 
myself, cut it up and share it, let it rot in the fruit basket, bury it 
in the garden, pickle it in formaldehyde, or or or. This is what 
open-endedness refers to. Open-endedness is limited to uses that 
do not contradict any other kind of law. For example, I cannot 
justify  intentionally  causing  your  asphyxiation  by  lodging  my 
apple very deep in your throat, simply by reference to the fact 
that  it  is  my apple  (i.e.  over  which  I  have  open-ended  use-
privileges). Criminal law still applies. But since it would apply 
whether or not  the apple was mine,  indeed whether it  was an 
apple or a fist that asphyxiated you, Harris calls such prohibitions 
property-independent.  While it  is  possible to imagine societies 
that are structured  without such open-ended powers of persons 
over things, Harris holds that no actually existing societies are 
structured that way.
For Harris, the institution of property presupposes the notion of 
open-ended powers and privileges which a person can have over 
things, and which authorise the pursuit of ends that are entirely 
justified simply by virtue of being the person’s own ends. These 
ends  might  be  worthwhile,  healthy,  cooperative,  or  even 
altruistic, but they might well not be. The characteristic of the 
idea of property is that it legitimises (within the confines of the 
rest of the law) whatever choices an owner makes. The owner is 
cast in the image of the monarch who is the source of legitimacy 
rather than its object. Within the little king’s realm, the king is 
right  whatever.  Of  course,  as  already discussed,  Harris  is  not 
committed to the view that the pursuit of self-interest, is the only 
or primary motivation for human action. He does show, however, 
that  the  conception  of  property  as  open-ended  power  is 
fundamental  to  its  legal  operation,  and  that  the  vision  of  the 
individual  sovereign  is  at  the  heart  of  the  property  system of 
capitalist democracy. 
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The notion of open-ended use-privileges  to and control-powers 
over things  which  authorise  self-seekingness  might  be  a 
prevailing  notion,  systemically  instituted.  It  might  also  be  a 
notion that is presupposed in all existing discussions of property 
relations,  but  this  does  obviously  not  mean that  it  is  only  by 
manifesting this notion that social relations with regard to things 
can be structured. Harris of course does not deny this. In fact, he 
expounds in  detail  the  social  structures  of  imaginary  societies 
that  show  that  social  life  can  be  organised  entirely  without 
reference to this fundamental notion of ownership (which I will 
continue  calling  the  dominion  conception).  However,  he  calls 
such  societies  “property-less”,  exactly  because  they  do  not 
conceive of  relations  between people  with regard to  things in 
terms of (primarily) dominion (Harris 1996: 15-23).
But this break between property and non-property is exactly the 
kind of break which I want to overcome. Why is that necessary? 
Would I not be stretching the concept of property too far and too 
thin? What usefulness would remain in the term? Property, most 
contemporary  commentators  would  agree,  is  social  relations 
between  people  with  regard  to  things,  which  are  given  their 
particular  content  through  particular  normative  protocols.  By 
providing a framework within which all  such relations can be 
(roughly)  understood,  we  are  also providing a  framework that 
facilitates  a comparison.  Private  property,  then,  can clearly be 
seen as one particular configuration of property relations in an 
ocean of possibilities. In fact, it will be seen as a set of several 
different such configurations, rather than a monolithic idea itself. 
This will help to free our imagination with regard to the possible. 
Moreover, by being able to account for commoning through such 
a widened understanding of property, we enable a more detailed 
comparison  of  commoning  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  various 
forms of private property on the other. If we think of commoning 
as the normatively guided practice of particular kinds of social 
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relations  with  regard  to  things,  we  can  develop  a  property 
framework  which  accounts  for  different  possibilities  of 
commons.
2.4 A framework for property as social relations.  
Let  me  hence  begin  to  present  a  framework  based  on  the 
definitions of property as social relations which we encountered 
above.  It  should be understood primarily as a heuristic device 
(rather than an exposed ontology)  for  the purpose of bringing 
into  relief  certain  features  of  relations  between  people  with 
regard to things which I would like to discuss. 
2.4.1 The variables of social relations with regard to things.
What  this  framework  reveals  is  that  property,  as  patterns  of 
conventions  structuring  social  relations  with  regard  to  things, 
always refers to (i) a social group amongst whom the relations 
hold and are performed (the relating subject), (ii) some resource, 
object or set of objects with regard to which the relations hold 
and are performed (the  related-to object),  and (iii)  the way in 
which  the  relations  are  shaped,  that  is  constrained  and/or 
enabled, through normative protocols (the relational modality). 
These  variables  will  find  different  extensions  in  different 
contexts.  For  example,  the  relating  subject might  be  the 
population of a nation state, it might be a tribal community, a 
corporation,  a  social  movement,  or  the  whole  of  humanity. 
Property associates pluralities of people, and so an analysis of 
property  requires  us  to  inquire  into  some  such  plurality.  In 
important  ways,  the  relating  subject  is  co-emergent  with  the 
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relational  modality.  That  is,  communities  are  continuously 
reproduced through people’s interaction with each other and the 
things  that  surround  them  on  the  terms  given  by  their 
conception(s)  of  property.  The  normative  protocols  that  shape 
these interactions, conversely, emerge and are transformed in the 
continuous reproduction of community. It might be important to 
clarify here that the “relating subject”, as I construe it, is the A+C 
of the often used schema “A owns B against C”. It is not merely 
A. This defines a starting point for an analysis of property that is 
social, rather than one focused on the “owner” (the individual or 
group holder of use-privileges and control-powers).
The related-to object, as already stated, might be a resource, an 
object or a set of objects,  or a heterogeneous pool comprising 
various  resources  and  objects.  These  might  be  big  or  small,  
tangible or intangible, significant or trivial, but they will always 
have some meaning and value to people. The stuff of the material 
world is suffused with meaning and value: as human beings, we 
do not only name things, we also order them in categories and in 
relation to one another, conferring meaning on them through that 
ordering/relating process.  But,  of  course, we do not name and 
order things out of the blue, or from some sort of “view from 
nowhere”  (Nagel  1989).  Things  play  roles  in  the  human 
lifeworlds  they  furnish,  and  gain  their  meanings  accordingly. 
Meanings  mostly  develop  over  long  periods  of  time,  and  in 
association with occurrences,  cosmologies,  actions,  and all  the 
other things that make up human social realities.  It  is because 
people  dwell  and  participate  in  the  material  world,  always 
already relating to all its constituents, that meaning emerges. It 
emerges from lived,  human-non-human interaction,  rather than 
being  super-imposed by  the  human onto  the  non-human from 
some  kind  of  external  position  (Ingold  2000).  The  particular 
meaning and value that something has for people thus depends 
on, and in fact arises from, the particular ways in which people 
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interact  with  it  (over  time).  While  objects  are  most  often 
concrete,  measurable  entities,  resources  need  not  be.  A forest 
might seem like a relatively bounded thing in most of Europe, 
but  in  the  Amazon  basin  “the  forest”  is  an  all-pervasive, 
amorphous meta-resource providing all that is needed for food, 
home-building,  fuel,  ornamentation  and  medicine.  It  is  in 
constant transformation, growth and decay, and even if we could 
measure  its  totality  in  some  way,  it  might  have  significantly 
changed soon thereafter. Similarly, Free Software can be seen as 
a pool of software code, made up of individual code fragments, 
but also of projects that combine, transform, rework, comment on 
and discard these fragments. The pool is growing and changing 
constantly, and might one day dry up. The related-to object of our 
framework maps onto most  other characterisations of property 
systems, as the B of the “A owns B against C” relation.
The  relational  modality is  what  characterises  the  associations 
between the entities that make up the relating subject (between 
the individuals and sub-groups of individuals of an overarching 
community, i.e. A+C) with regard to the related-to object. To say 
that property is relations between people with regard to things 
does  of  course  not  tell  us  anything  very  specific  about  these 
relations. Property in general says very little about property in 
particular (which is possibly an additional reason for why it is so 
easy to conflate the two: specifying property in one way or the 
other  at  least  commits  us  to  a  particular  understanding of  the 
relations that actually pertain or ought to pertain between people 
with  regard  to  things  –  rather  than  just  positing  that  such 
relations exist). “A owns B against C” does not tell us anything 
about  what  “owns  against”  actually  means,  apart  from that  it 
somehow  associates  A  and  C  with  regard  to  B.  It  is  the 
specificities of that association that an analysis of property must 
address.
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Above we spoke of the primacy of interaction between humans, 
and  between  humans  and  non-humans.  Co-existence  is  the 
starting point for all of us. If we proceed from this point of view 
of the interaction between humans and things, it should become 
obvious that the relational modality of our property framework is 
primarily an active one. We do things with people and the stuff 
that surrounds us. But what we do is usually dependent on what 
we  can do, and what we can do is partly subject to norms and 
conventions, customs and laws, freedoms and prohibitions. It is 
these  normative  protocols  that  guide  social  interactions  with 
regard to things that relational modality refers to. This brings in 
the “controlling behaviour” aspect of the definition we adopted 
above. Property relations, we said, are a “pattern of rights, duties, 
privileges, powers, etc., which control the behavior of individuals 
or  groups  in  relation  to  one  another  and  to  the  custody, 
possession, use, enjoyment, disposal, etc., of various classes of 
objects”. It is the particularity of these action-guiding protocols 
that an inquiry into the relational modality of a particular form of 
property would set out to describe. It would be an inquiry into 
what  “owns against” of the “A owns B against  C” expression 
actually  involves  in  practice.   Harris’s  open-ended  ownership 
interests are specifications of relational modality on our account. 
The kind of social analysis of property for which I am arguing 
hence  begins  with  an  inquiry  into  the  particularities  of  the 
relating subject, the related-to object, and the relational modality  
of the property relations under examination. For purposes of this 
essay,  this  means  that  if  we  want  to  understand  the  property 
relations  that  characterise  the  Free  Software  movement,  for 
example, then we begin by asking the questions posed above. 
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2.4.2 Articulated and unarticulated normative protocols.
The  Free  Software  movement  is  a  translocal  community  of, 
primarily,  software  developers  and  software  users,  who  are 
associated by their common creation, maintenance, reproduction, 
distribution  and  use  of  (free)  software,  in  a  shared  vision  of 
software development. The pattern of rights and duties that guide 
their activities is clearly articulated in the movement’s defining 
legal document, the GPL software license. We will examine the 
GPL in Section 3.5. In the case of Free Software, the pattern is 
articulated in legal detail, while in other contexts it may not be 
articulated at all. This is an important point for understanding the 
social analysis of property that I envision: the rights and duties 
may be embedded in shared customary practices or other forms 
of unwritten rules, without being legally articulated or otherwise 
made  explicit.  Hackers’ customs  were  implicitly  embedded  in 
hackers’ practices in this way before they were articulated in the 
GPL. “Rights and duties” hence have to be understood in a loose 
sense as referring to the kinds of freedoms and responsibilities 
people  in  social  settings  take  one  another  to  have.  Hallowell 
clarifies:
“From  a  comparative  point  of  view  …  property, 
conceived  as  a  social  institution,  does  not 
necessarily imply legal relations in the narrow sense 
as  part  of  its  structure.  But  it  may be  discovered 
upon analysis that the social  function performed by 
law in securing property interests in our culture may, 
in  another  society,  be  performed  by  a  non-legal 
institution. Such variables are of great importance to 
our understanding of the structure and functioning 
of  property  as  a  human institution.”  (Hallowell 
1974: 238)
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Social structuration that might be upheld by the letter of the law 
in one society, might be upheld by a different social institution in 
another.  Such different  social  institutions  might  be customary: 
habits, rituals, ceremonies, manners or, to put it simply, unwritten 
law. Indeed, customs are often precursors for legal articulation45. 
On my account Richard Stallman successfully articulated hacker 
customs into property relations in order to defend the software 
commons, even though he does not recognise his achievement on 
those terms.
Approaching the practices of Free Software from our framework 
will allow us to identify the particular features that distinguish 
“Free  Software  as  property”  (Chapter  3)  from  other 
configurations of property relations. Doing so will reveal aspects 
of both Free Software and private property that otherwise pass 
unnoticed. The former is an example of how the latter  can be 
radically  transformed  through  subversive  use  of  the  decision-
making  authority  that  private  property  entails.  This  will  only 
become fully clear in Section 3.5.
To propose a common framework within which all the different 
varieties of relations between people with regard to things can be 
located allows us to contrast and evaluate them with more ease. It 
is not to flatten out important distinctions in the variety of human 
social experience and organisation, but it is to highlight that in 
45 There is no scope to deal properly with the concept of custom in relation to 
positive law here.  I  had previously drafted a  chapter  on customary law, 
particularly drawing upon the work of Platt (1894), Smith (1903) and Allen 
(1927) as well as Rose (1993):“It is at least certain that in many societies of  
which  we  have  evidence,  before  any  clearly  articulated  system of  law-
making and law-dispensing has developed, the conduct of men in society is 
governed by customary rules...they are 'legal'...inasmuch as they are binding 
and obligatory rules of conduct (not merely of faith or conviction), and that 
the breach of them is the breach of a positive duty” (Allen 1927: 64)
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terms of social relations with regard to things, certain variables 
(subject,  object,  modality)  generally apply,  and their  particular 
extensions in different contexts speak of the variety of ways in 
which  human  co-habitation,  of  a  hamlet,  a  mountain,  a 
metropolis,  cyberspace,  planet  Earth,  including  all  their 
respective non-human constituents, can be realised. 
By starting from such a general view on property, we “snap” the 
conventional and constricted understanding of property as private 
property, and open it up to the multitude of modalities of agency 
that characterise social relations with regard to things. Moreover, 
this  framework allows  us  to  articulate  property relations  from 
community  practices.  Such  articulation,  or  making  explicit, 
fosters reflexivity in communities, and is particularly helpful for 
those who struggle against privatisation. It  can be a means by 
which  to  constitute  and  strengthen  spaces  which  operate  on 
logics different from, and maybe even subversive of the logics of 
capitalism. It is, in my view, somewhat ironic that this way of 
articulating practised social relations with regard to things into 
explicit property relations has been so well performed by Richard 
Stallmann and the Free Software Foundation, who refuse to see 
property in this way, let  alone consider Free Software on such 
terms at all. But to look at matters in this way is, I believe, to 
better recognise their achievements and the wider potentialities 
involved.
Our  framing of  property  as  particular  configurations  of  social 
relations,  which  at  its  most  general  level  associates  a  relating 
subject with regard to a related-to object in a relational modality, 
pushes us to inquire into the details of these variables in order to 
understand and evaluate any one property system. The behaviour 
of  individuals  or  groups  in  relation  to  one  another  and  with 
regard to various classes of objects is guided by particular laws, 
norms, customs, or values, which vary from one socio-cultural 
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context  to  another,  and  often  within  any  one  such  context. 
Property systems might be multiple and overlapping, maybe even 
conflicting  within  any  particular  setting.  A social  analysis  of 
property would have to be attentive to such multiplicity.
But leaving such complexity aside for the moment, in order to 
illustrate the particular way in which the relational modality of 
private property is predominantly configured, we shall examine 
now the (legal) specifications that determine the actual rights and 
duties  of  a  private  property  owner  with  regard  to  others  in 
capitalist democracies. 
2.5 Specification of property: the configurations of relational   
modality.
I  have already said that  Harris’s open-ended,  self-seekingness-
authorising  ownership  interests  should,  on  our  model,  be 
understood as specifying the relational modality of basic private  
property.
A diagram (on the following page) will aid the understanding of 
the discussion that is to follow.
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Illustration 2: Basic configuration of private property.
2.5.1 The basics of private property.
Use of or access to a resource is a fundamental element of social 
relations with regard to things. We said that most of the time, our 
interactions with things are about  doing things. I might eat the 
apple, or cut it up and share it, or bury it, or let it rot in the fruit 
basket, but a precondition of whatever I do with it, is my access 
to it. Use-privileges are about accessing and using resources – in 
specific as well as open-ended ways.
The function of property, according to Harris (and Waldron and 
others), is to distribute decision-making authority over the use of 
things (control  power) along with access to these things (use-
privileges). While control-power might lie with one person (e.g. 
the landlady), and use-privileges with another (e.g. the tenant), in 
the paradigmatic case of private property, these are collocated in 
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the sense that it is the landlady who can make the decision to 
grant the use-privileges that are part of her ownership interests to 
the tenant.  The two grey arrows of Illustration 2 are meant to 
illustrate  this  collocation  of  what  is  sometimes  also  called 
“beneficial  use”  (use-privileges)  and  “title”  (control-power). 
Control  power,  on  Harris’s  account  (which  I  accept  as 
expounding the paradigmatic case of private property),  is  self-
referential in terms of its legitimation. The landlady’s decisions 
with regard to, say, whom she is going to let her house to, are 
legitimate simply because she is the landlady. She can justify all 
her  decisions  simply  by  stating  that  they  were  hers.  The 
institution of  private  property authorises  her  to  exploit  all  her 
control powers and use privileges according to her rational self-
interest – or whim. The thin black arrow to the left indicates the 
referral. Self-seekingness is not only authorised, it authorises her 
decisions.  It  is  in  this way that  the individual  is  enthroned as 
sovereign in her own realm. 
Trespassory rules, the social norms and legal protection that keep 
people  from accessing  or  using  what  is  under  someone else’s 
control  power  without  their  consent,  circumscribe  the  realm 
within  which  the  individual  is  sovereign.  This  realm  can  be 
understood as a real territory, especially in the context of land 
ownership: trespassory rules legally fortify the fence. But more 
importantly, this realm is a commixture of a thing and its open-
ended uses: trespassory rules do not only keep you from sitting 
on  my  chair  without  my  consent,  they  also  keep  you  from 
interfering  with  my  painting  it  fluorescent  green.  Within  this 
“realm”,  the  owner  is  free  to  dictate  uses  (unless  she  has 
contracted some of them away as the landlady has to the tenant). 
Trespassory protection legally secures this power. We shall see in 
Section  3.5  that  it  is  copyright  that  circumscribes  the  realm 
within which Free Software can flourish.
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Interestingly, as already broached, on the economistic account it 
is simply assumed that once a sovereign is in place, care is taken 
of the realm, because the individual is an agent that optimises the 
use of resources and generates the most wealth. But as Proudhon 
so  usefully  reminds  us,  the  Aristotelian  premise  does  not 
necessarily hold:
“The Roman law defined property as the right to use 
and abuse one's own within the limits of the law -- 
jus utendi et abutendi re sua, guatenus juris ratio  
patitur.  A justification of the word abuse has been 
attempted,  on  the  ground  that  it  signifies,  not 
senseless  and  immoral  abuse,  but  only  absolute 
domain. Vain distinction! ... The proprietor may, if 
he chooses, allow his crops to rot under foot; sow 
his  field  with  salt;  milk  his  cows  on  the  sand; 
change  his  vineyard  into  a  desert,  and  use  his 
vegetable-garden  as  a  park:  do  these  things 
constitute abuse, or not? In the matter of property, 
use  and abuse are  necessarily  indistinguishable.”46 
(1840: 42)
An effective distribution of care – so that the things of the world 
may not only be used, but used in intergenerational perpetuity, 
for  example  –  is  not  achieved  simply  through  paradigmatic 
private property arrangements. Unless decision-making authority 
is  legitimated  by  reference  to  something  else  than  mere  self-
seekingness,  care  cannot  adequately  be  accounted  for  on  this 
model. In fact, we may say that the distribution of care has been 
entirely overridden by the distribution of self-seeking decision-
46 Abuti in Latin means both 'to misuse' and 'to use up, to consume', which 
might temper Proudhon's exclamations somewhat. His point is still relevant 
to our discussion, however.
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making  authority  in  the  institution  of  private  property.  By 
mapping the elements out in our heuristic diagram, we learn that 
it  is  not  necessarily  the  exclusivity  of  the  decision-making 
authority (the landlady can make the decision exclusively,  and 
she can make the decision to exclude you) that is the normatively 
most problematic issue with dominion. Another, possibly deeper-
seated  issue  concerns  the  value  by  reference  to  which  such 
decisions are made. 
It is a particular vision of the interrelations of autonomy, agency, 
identity,  authority  that  underlies  the  conception  that  the 
legitimacy of a decision derives from who made it rather than by 
reference to what it is justified. It is the instantiation of private 
property  itself  that  creates  the  automatic  link  between 
justification  and  self-seekingness:  we  have  projected  the 
monarch into the individual.  The individual  (like  the  monarch 
before  her)  becomes  the  source  of  all  legitimacy:  within  the 
confines  of  my  realm,  what  I  want  and  choose  is  right.  The 
institution of private property confers the power to make might 
into  right.  In  Harris’s  terms,  it  allows  for  desire  to  become 
authorised choice (Harris 1996: 102). But to place the source of 
legitimacy  into  the  individual  will  is  the  expression  of  a 
particular value. It is the valuing of individual choice that needs 
to  make  reference  only  to  itself.  It  is  the  valuing  of  a 
subjectivisation  of  values  (cf.  Sayer  1999)  over  and  above 
coming together in a mutual shaping of values.
2.5.2 Capitalist private property.
Capitalist  private  property has  to  be  characterised  in  slight 
distinction  from  “basic  private  property”.  It  has  been  argued 
decisively (Christman 1996; Holderness 2003; Berle and Means 
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1932) that it is especially  two conditions that are central to the 
particular  configuration  of  private  property  in  capitalist 
democracy.  For  the  influential  jurist-cum-economist  Richard 
Posner, the function of property rights is to “create incentives to 
use  resources  efficiently”  (1977:  10),  and  exclusive  property 
rights are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the efficient 
use  of  resources.  Wealth  is  thought  to  be  maximised  when 
resources  are  used  most  efficiently.  Wealth  maximisation, 
however,  “requires a mechanism by which the [owner] can be 
induced to transfer rights in the property to someone who can 
work it more productively; a transferable property right is such a 
mechanism”  (Posner  1977:  29).  Private  property  rights-based 
relations within capitalist democracy are hence specified by the 
collocation of (i)  exclusionary rights, that is, control powers or 
decision  rights  and  (ii)  exchange  rights,  that  is,  rights  to 
alienability on the market and wealth effects. This collocation is 
at the core of the privatising forces of the capitalist economy: in 
the  so-called  free  market,  agents  (i)  enjoy  exclusive  decision 
making power over goods and resources (or capital) and (ii) the 
rights to any income that the fruits of their resources may bear 
and generate through exchange in the market place. 
“This  collocation  of  decision  rights  and  wealth 
effects  provides  both  the  incentive  and  the 
feasibility for value-enhancing transfers. Berle and 
Means ... appropriately call collocation the “atom of 
property”  and view it  as  “the  very  foundation  on 
which the economic order of the past three centuries 
has rested” (Holderness 2003: 77).
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This (second)47 collocation will have to be added to our diagram 
(see Illustration 3 on the following page).
We might conceive of the right and privilege to wealth effects as 
part and parcel of use privileges. But it adds a particular quality 
to  private  property,  making  it  characteristic  of  the  particular  
form of private property that structures capitalism. 
It  is  this  particular  configuration  of  relational  modality  that 
converts  things  into  commodities,  and  makes  the  capitalist 
market feasible.48
47 The first collocation we observed of decision-making authority or control 
power  and  use  privileges  or  access  has,  to  my  knowledge,  never  been 
identified as being of much significance. Given that, as we shall see below, 
splitting either of these collocations changes social dynamic significantly, I 
have decided to highlight the collocated nature of both of them.
48 Interestingly, corporations are usually characterised by a separation of the 
use-control and wealth-allocation functions of property (or the “separation 
of  control  and  ownership”  in  Berle  and  Means  terms  (1947:  93)).  
Shareholders, for example, have the right to a share of the wealth effects, 
yet cannot usually expect a right to make use of corporate assets. However, 
because a corporation counts as a juridical person, of which shareholders 
and chief executive officers are just parts, we can still sensibly speak of a 
collocation here.
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Illustration 3: Capitalist configuration of private property.
2.5.3 Splitting the atom of capitalist property.
If the collocation of control powers and wealth privileges is the 
“atom of property”, what happens, we may wonder, if we split it?
A simple illustration with regard to the real estate market may be 
illustrative. If we decoupled control powers and wealth privileges 
with regard to land and housing, i.e. if we removed the exchange 
rights  from the  property  arrangement  that  governs  real  estate, 
then the speculative aspect of the markets in land and housing 
would,  if  not  completely  disappear,  at  least  be  severely 
undermined49.  Although the land and housing market would be 
profoundly  changed  with  far  reaching  implications  of  wealth 
distribution, you remain a private home owner with the right to 
49 For this to work in practice, other organisational forms for the circulation of 
housing would of course be necessary in order to ensure the mobility of 
people. However, this merely serves as a heuristic example here.
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exclude others, but  not the right to sell  it.  You and I could be 
house owners and enjoy a substantial part of the privileges that 
come with being house owners, but we could not sell our houses 
to one another or to others. With regard to land, people could 
exclusively own pieces of land for growing crops, but they could 
not  engage  in  speculative  trade  of  land.  Moreover,  we  could 
imagine that, if we only reconfigured the property arrangements 
with regard to the use of land, but not of the fruits of the land, the 
right to sell those crops could still obtain. Removing the right to 
exchange,  one  of  the  powers  of  the  owner  under  a  capitalist 
private property regime, would hence make the real estate market 
– as we know it – disappear. The kind of speculation that makes 
some  people  very  rich  through  controlling  land  and  through 
letting, but which keeps others confined to renting in poverty and 
without direct access to land, would not exist. At the very least, it 
would  be  transformed  to  such  a  degree  that  it  would  be 
unrecognisable.  In  other  words,  the  implications  of  private 
property  with  regard  to  land  and  housing  would  be  entirely 
different if only one of its conditions was changed or removed.50 
Another way of reconfiguring the private property relations that 
define capitalist democracy would be to alter the conditions of 
(for  example)  the  right  to  exchange,  rather  than  removing  it 
completely.  If  exchange  rights  were  not  decoupled  from 
exclusion  rights,  but  rather  redefined,  such  as  through  the 
prescription  of  wider  community  involvement  in  the  transfer, 
(legal)  agency  of  owners  in  the  market  of  land  and  housing 
would  necessarily  unfold  completely  differently,  literally  on 
50 An argument  for the ownership of  one's organs could also unfold along 
these lines, because it would not be prone to criticisms based on the claim 
that it encourages a trade in organs. A poor person would through exclusive 
ownership, but without exchange rights, not be encouraged by the law of 
property to trade in her organs. 
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different terms or conditions. Speculation would be possible, but 
it could be specified that those implicated by speculative transfer 
would have to be consulted in the process of transfer. Transfers – 
and thus speculation – would be significantly slowed down, and 
could  then  be  assessed  through  community  participation  on  a 
case  by case basis.  Exchange would thus  become much more 
transparent.  The  same  principle  could  be  applied  to  currency 
speculation  and  such  activities  as  computer  algorithm  and 
network based currency speculation consisting of many transfers 
per  day  would  effectively  become  impossible.  There  is  an 
initiative called the Tobin Tax, which proposes a simple tax on 
currency trading that is designed with a view to limit speculation 
in  currencies.  In  structure  the  Tobin  Tax  is  similar  to  the 
alteration of exchange rights, but does not constitute a removal of 
the  fundamental  right  that  is  currently  facilitating  financial 
speculation in currencies across borders. The Tobin Tax does not 
imply that “speculation” will definitively disappear. It “merely” 
implies that those who have the desire to speculate in and exploit 
the potentials for wealth in taking exclusive control of currency 
with a view to speculative trade, will be subjected to taxation that 
either: (a) might lower the incentives for doing so, or (b) will  
generate an income for the  state that  can be redistributed,  for 
example  through  the  provision  of  universal  health  care  or 
perhaps a basic income for all human beings or instead used for 
the  purchase  of  repressive  technologies.  This  example  is  for 
illustrative purposes only.  The ambiguity associated with what 
the  state  can  and will  do  with  such  revenues  –  including  the 
problem of the state as such from an anti-capitalist perspective – 
should be obvious. Moreover, the Tobin Tax as an additional and 
limiting element of exchange rights is an indirect and rather weak 
version of the addition of “community involvement in transfers” 
that I was suggesting above. It does not carry as much weight as 
direct  community  participation  might  do  in  the  changing  of 
socio-economic organisation,  but  it  is  structurally  very similar 
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and, nevertheless, arguably a reconfiguration of property worth 
considering51. However, such discussion crucially should involve 
open debate about the use of those revenues. Such state income 
could in theory be used for the upkeep of squats, social centres 
and permaculture villages, rather than for the consolidation of the 
state.
2.5.4 Personal property.
This point about property (re-)configuration can be expanded by 
focusing  on  the  related-to  object.  Many  of  the  classical 
justifications of some form of private property (based primarily 
on decision or exclusion rights) were arguably never intended to 
apply to all classes of objects. Arguments for an inalienable right 
to  private  property at  their  most  laudable  refer  to  a  relatively 
small amount of things, those that constitute a person’s identity 
(Hegel), those that a person has directly mixed their labour with 
(Locke), and those that are necessary for an at least minimally 
dignified life, free from hunger and fear. Such a right would not 
include the right to unlimited accumulation, and would not obtain 
with regard to  the  means of  production and natural  resources. 
There  is  a  wide  variety  of  arguments,  reasons  and  narratives 
inherent  in  the  writings  of  the  philosophers  who  originally 
justified private property as an important theoretical aspect of the 
transition into capitalism that are relevant for delimiting personal 
property. Many different aspects could be singled out, indeed an 
entire  thesis  could  be  written  about  just  that.  I  am  here  not 
51 During the current financial crisis the Tobin Tax has unsurprisingly gained 
currency, as it were, in mainstream debate. See for instance “The time is 
ripe  for  a  Tobin  tax”  by  Larry  Elliot  (2009).  However,  see  De  Angelis 
(1999/2000) for a critical examination of the shortcomings of the Tobin Tax 
in the real world of speculation.
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arguing for what kind of objects ought to be the object of such 
personal, private property relations, but merely raising the point 
that there might exist some that ought to be.
The arguments of Hegel, Locke and others suggest that a certain 
kind of exclusive decision-making power over and responsibility 
for some things is of great value to individuals. People get bound 
up with things in constitutive ways that are not always fetishistic 
in an unhealthy sense. If we remember that we said a relation can 
be constituted by interaction, that is it can be performed as well 
as symbolically posited, we should be able to see that there are 
relations between an individual and an object that are intimate 
because of the significance (to the individual) of the action that 
involves both of them. The cuddling of a teddy bear comes to 
mind,  or  the  daily  use  of  a  toothbrush  or  saucepan,  or  the 
occasional, cathartic weeping over an old photograph. Hence a 
certain  kind  of  exclusive  personal  control  (possibly  never 
absolute) over a few things in the world – enough to sustain a 
realm of autonomy and freedom – is needed in any community. 
Regarding land, its resources, and the means of production and 
distribution, however, I maintain that access to and use of them is 
so  crucial  for  basic  subsistence,  while  the  way in  which it  is 
accessed and used have such significant social and environmental 
implications that affect, ultimately, the whole of humanity (and 
all other living beings), that the configuration of these property 
relations  ought  to  be  approached  differently  than  the 
configuration  of  personal  property.  These,  however,  are 
normative side points for now.
The atom of the private property relations that define capitalist 
democracy has been identified as the collocation of exclusionary 
and exchange rights and it follows from this that one of the most 
profound reconfigurations of capitalist property relations consists 
in splitting that atom, or radically altering the composition of that 
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atom. One way in which that can be done is by adding limitations 
to the scope of those exchange rights. I will show in Chapter 3 
how  Free  Software  is  a  reconfiguration  of  property  relations 
where the two elements whose collocation makes up copyright – 
exclusion and exchange – are both redefined in such a way, and 
their social implications thereby changed so fundamentally, that 
they are hardly recognisable (which might explain why it is that 
some authors fail to understand Free Software as an instance of 
property relations at all). 
Having seen that the kind of community that property relations 
give rise to can be altered in potentially radical ways merely by 
small  changes  to  the  normative  codes  that  guide  collective 
behaviour  with  regard  to  things,  we  can  begin  to  imagine 
property configurations of many different kinds with regard to 
different things and for different purposes. 
2.6 Property and commons.  
Because  of  the  way  in  which  we have  construed  our  relating 
subject (as the overarching community of our analysis), we can 
see that the relational modality within capitalist democracy is, as 
a starting point, primarily one of asymmetry and exclusion, and 
hence also fragmentation. However, the asymmetry is, in some 
not insignificant way, shared. Rose (1993) suggests that private 
property  can  be  understood  as  the  “common  property”  of  a 
community which has agreed upon, embraced and considered the 
implementation of private property theirs (or, we might want to 
add,  upon  which  private  property  was  imposed).  De  Angelis 
relatedly argues that: “No social relation among people can do 
without  some types  of  commons  that  act  as  a  centre  of  their 
interaction.  Not  even  in  capitalist  production”  (De  Angelis 
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2005b: 68). In capitalist democracy, the normative protocols that 
are private  property rights are part  of  such a  centre.  A+C are 
united,  as  well  as  separated,  through the  common values  that 
underlie  the  institution  of  private  property.  Whether  or  not, 
however, private property continuously causes fragmentation is 
not the primary question for a general understanding of property. 
The more important point that I want to make here is that not 
only  do  communities  make  property  relations,  but  property 
relations make communities. And, as repeatedly noted, it is the 
particular specifications of property that actually give structure 
to a community.
Above I have introduced the reader to the basic configuration of 
private property, and its capitalist variant. In this section, I will 
examine the structure of property configurations that are usually 
contrasted  with  private  property  and  variably  referred  to  as 
common,  public,  communal,  communitarian,  or  collective 
property, or some such.  While we have seen that there can be 
even  within  one  particular  school  of  thought  a  lot  of 
disagreement  over  the  particular  kind  of  thing  that  private 
property  is,  its  central  idea  is  usually  that  decision-making 
authority  over  particular  resources  is  allocated  to  individuals. 
That is, individuals are given rights to make decisions about what 
is being done with a resource and who can do so – and they are 
given  these  rights  as  against  everybody else.  Private  property 
being a right, the owners’ decisions with regard to the object of 
their  ownership  will  be  backed  up  by  public  force.  Common 
property is sometimes used to refer to joint ownership – where a 
determinate  number,  but  more  than  one  person  hold  private 
property rights in something together. This form of property is 
probably best thought of as a particular configuration of private 
property and is obviously central to capitalism, in the form of 
firms, corporations and (indeed) charities.
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2.6.1 The importance of access.
Benkler  contrasts  “property”  (really,  private property)  with 
commons, which he divides into four different types according to 
two  parameters.  The  first  parameter  concerns  the  collectivity 
which has access to the commons: is it a defined group, or an 
indeterminate  “everyone”?  Open  commons  are  open  to  all, 
whereas  limited-access  commons  are  open  only  to  a  defined 
group of people. In that sense the latter are, according to Benkler, 
better  thought  of  as  “limited common property regimes rather 
than  commons,  because  they  behave  as  property  vis-a-vis  the 
entire  world  except  members  of  the  group who  together  hold 
them in common” (2006: 61). The second parameter concerns the 
regulation of access. All limited common property regimes that 
have been studied, so Benkler, are governed by some set of rules 
regarding their use, but of course we could at least imagine some 
that were not regulated in that way. Open-access commons are 
those  that  can  be  accessed  unconditionally  by  all.  Other 
commons  might  be  governed  by  rules,  but  even  so,  these 
constraints, if present at all, “are symmetric among all users, and 
cannot be unilaterally controlled by any single individual” (2006: 
61-62).
Regulated Unregulated
Open to all Regulated commons Open-access 
commons




Illustration 4: Benkler’s commons.
On this conception, access is central. Classifications turn on the 
question of who has access (all or only some) and what kind of 
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access  they have (“anything goes”,  free for  all,  or  conditional 
access, specified by rules). This is of course in many ways in line 
with the conventional view that property is about access to and 
use of things. The distribution of control power, that is, decision-
making  authority,  however,  is  slightly  submerged  on  this 
perspective as the questions of regulation and openness take its 
place.
I have to add here a few observations. Firstly, one wonders why 
regulation  is  supposed  to  be  a  defining  parameter:  if  entirely 
open-access commons exist primarily as a justificatory “tragic” 
fiction  for  private  property  (see  Section  2.1),  and  all  known 
“limited property regime commons” are regulated; that is, if all 
realistic commons are governed by  some kind of rule,  why is 
regulation  a  parameter  at  all?  Secondly,  we  might  be  able  to 
imagine “open” commons that are governed by rules that do not 
apply symmetrically among all users, which can however neither 
be controlled unilaterally. What about a lake to whom everyone 
has symmetric access in terms of swimming,  but only women 
can remove water for their gardens from? Assuming that this rule 
has  not  been  unilaterally  imposed,  but  evolved  over  time  or 
through  a  collective  decision-making  process,  would  we  be 
looking at a limited property regime in terms of “water-removal” 
and at a commons in terms of “swimming”?
Moreover,  one  is  easily  led  to  muse  whether,  on  Benkler’s 
characterisation, there is anything else than air (his example) that 
could ever be a truly open commons. Of course access to certain 
things can be  potentially open to  all,  such as  Central  Park in 
Manhattan, if only everyone could get a visa, and across the sea. 
A “virtual”  internet  commons,  similarly,  might  be  potentially 
open to all, but actually to very many it is not. The question this 
raises  is  why  potential openness  is  supposed to  be  a  usefully 
defining parameter. 
192
Properties of Property: A Jurisprudential Analysis
However, “openness” (always potential), if inquired into a little 
more, might tell  us something that is somewhat hidden by the 
terminology. The question of whether a commons is (potentially) 
open  or  not  makes  a  difference  in  a  situation  of  conflict: 
trespassory  rules  would  circumscribe  a  “limited  common 
property  commons”,  whereas  they  would  not  circumscribe  an 
open commons. In a court of law, “openness-to-all” would make 
a difference if someone had been denied access to a common 
resource. That is, potential openness seems to matter in terms of 
allegations  of  trespass and  conflict  resolution.  This  is  the 
conventional  view: openness means nobody can trespass,  after 
all,  the commons is open to all.  However,  if  all  realistic open 
commons  are  regulated  in  some  way,  then  we  might  wonder 
whether trespassory rules would not in some significant way still 
circumscribe even the open commons. After all, even if the group 
which has access to the commons is indeterminate (potentially 
open to anyone) rather than clearly defined (only open to a group 
of people that could potentially be listed), access would only be 
allowed  under  certain  conditions.  That  is,  access  would  be 
(potentially)  open to  anyone  who abides  by  the  conditions  of  
access (for example, access to a lake is open for swimming, but 
not for using the water in irrigation). While we might not be able 
to draw up a positive list of persons who have access as against 
everybody else (“Sarah, John and Paul, and all their offspring”, 
i.e. the defined group), we can clearly state the characteristics of 
someone who can have access as against someone who cannot 
(“she who abides by the rules”). Trespassory rules would hence 
still circumscribe the commons, yet trespass would not be based 
on  identity (in the birth certificate kind of sense), but on action 
(how do people behave). 
“Openness”, we might say, is meant to capture this difference: 
are people excluded from access for reasons of identity or for 
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reasons of action?52 We can note here that identity and action are 
key organising principles of social relations with regard to things 
that  are  rarely  made  explicit.  They  will  resurface  in  our 
discussion below. Again, however, the question of control power 
looms large: who is making the decisions with regard to who has 
access and under which conditions? I will now turn to Jeremy 
Waldron's  account  of  common property,  in  which  it  becomes 
clear  that  the  value by reference to  which these decisions  are 
legitimised plays an important role in the institution of property.
2.6.2 The importance of “whose interest”.
Waldron (1988) contrasts private property with common property 
on the one hand,  and collective property on the other.  On his 
account,  common  property  is  understood  as  referring  to 
resources, access to which is open to all and any member of that 
society or community. Rules with regard to such access might 
exist,  but  they exist  only in  order  to  enable  equal  access  and 
enjoyment,  or  care  and maintenance of  the resource.  A public 
park would fall  under this rubric. It might be forbidden to cut 
down trees or dig large holes or build pyramids in the park, but 
these rules merely exist to ensure that its main purpose as a place 
of recreation is upheld for all. 
What  is  called  common  property  by  Waldron  is  elsewhere 
sometimes called public (or state) property, as it often refers to 
resources that are administered by the government of a nation 
state  for  the  benefit  “the  public”.  The  public  is  of  course  an 
elusive  unit,  referring  usually  to  an  indeterminate  group  of 
52 I will  leave the question of the ontology of identity and action,  and the 
potential collapse of their distinction for someone else’s work.
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people,  even  if  connected  to  a  specific  nation  state.  Public 
property usually implies that use-privileges are available equally 
for  this  indeterminate  group of  people,  who,  however,  do  not 
have any control powers. The public authority administering the 
park would usually have such control powers, which is why it 
could  sell  the  grounds  to  a  developer  (unless  additional 
legislation  prohibits  it).  Public  property  is  predominantly 
characterised by a separation of “beneficial use” (use-privileges) 
from “title” (control-power), and the title holder is supposed to 
control and dispose of the property in the “public interest”.
On Waldron’s  account,  collective  property  refers  to  resources, 
decisions over access to which are made collectively, based on a 
determination  of  the  “social  interest” –  for  example  through 
“leisurely debate among the elders of a tribe [or] the forming and 
implementing of  a  Soviet-style  ‘Five-Year  Plan’”  (2004).  This 
implies that members of a society would not necessarily all have 
equal access to the collective resource. It might be that it was 
decided  to  be  in  the  best  interest  of  “all”  that,  say,  only  the 
elderly,  or  an  intellectual  elite  have  access  to  a  fresh  water 
reserve.
Waldron’s classification of property systems turns firstly on the 
question of who has the authority to make decisions over access 
to  resources  (individuals  and  quasi-individuals  such  as 
incorporated groups, or some wider collective such as a nation or 
a tribal  community).  Secondly,  it  turns on the question of “in 
whose interest” these decisions are made. Very crudely, private 
property allows for decisions to be made purely in pursuit of self-
interest,  common property ensures that  everyone’s (individual) 
interest  is  equally  addressed,  whereas  collective  property 
provides access to resources according to the overarching social 
interest, or common good.
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Illustration 5: Basic configuration of public property
It seems to me, however, that Waldron’s distinction collapses too 
easily. The objective of keeping access to a resource open to all  
embodies ultimately just as much a determination of “the social 
interest” as a decision with regard to a collective resource would 
–  which  is  why  the  administering  authority  is  understood  as 
accountable to the public with regard to, say, the park. We have 
also  already  discussed  the  way  in  which  a  system  that  is 
predominantly based on private property arrangements embodies 
a particular idea of the common interest (a particular common 
value),  namely  one  of  the  primacy  of  individual  autonomy – 
often  reduced  to  market  agency.  Despite  these  reservations 
regarding the distinction between “social interest” and “interest 
of all”, we can glean from Waldron’s account that (i) distribution 
of decision-making authority, on the one hand, and (ii) the norms 
and values according to which decisions are made, on the other, 
remain key organising principles of social relations with regard 
to things.
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On  Waldron’s  account,  common  (and  collective)  property  are 
characterised by their control power having to refer to something 
else than merely itself in order to be legitimate (see Illustration 
5). The monarch’s self-referentiality in terms of legitimacy has 
been abolished,  while the element  of care  is  often retained in 
public  property  arrangements  as  part  of  its  justificatory  basis. 
Trespassory rules, of course, continue to stake out and protect the 
scope  of  decision-making  authority  (made  legitimate  by  its 
consideration of the social interest).
2.6.3 Common  property  and  the  legitimacy  of  self-
seekingness.
For Harris,  property institutions,  as we have already seen,  are 
characterised by ownership interests – open-ended powers and 
privileges  with  regard  to  a  thing,  which  authorise  self-
seekingness,  hence  bridging  the  gap  between  desire  and 
authorised  choice  –  and  trespassory  rules  which  protect  these 
interests.  Ownership  interests  which  do  not  authorise  self-
seekingness,  but  rather  imply that  particular  uses  can only be 
justified by reference to something else than self-interest (e.g. the 
public good) are called quasi-ownership interests. Non-property, 
hence,  refers  to  resources  with  regard to  which  no ownership 
interests  or  quasi-ownership  interests,  and  concomitantly  no 
trespassory  rules  obtain53.  An  open-access  commons  is  the 
paradigmatic example of non-property on this account54. Harris 
refers  to  such  non-property as  “common property” (always  in 
53 Harris also excludes from property institutions resources access to which is 
protected  by  trespassory  rules,  but  without  any  reference  to  ownership 
interests. Since these “protected non-property holdings” are (according to 
Harris) “rare” (1996: 111), and we might want to add “hard to imagine at 
all”, I will not worry too much about them here.
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quotation  marks)  to  mirror  the  terminology  of  other  writers. 
Apart from “common property” (which, for Harris, really is no 
property  at  all)  there  are  other  forms  of  property  that  are 
nonetheless  distinguished  from  the  ownership  interests  plus 
trespassory  rules  model  characterising  individual  private 
property. These are (i) joint (or group or corporate) property, (ii) 
public (or state) property, and (iii) communitarian property.
As  already  mentioned,  joint  property  is  best  thought  of  as  a 
version of private property. It is characterised by the absence of  
trespassory rules  regarding  the  resource  between the  owners, 
even though there might be “internal regulations allocating use-
privileges and control-powers between members of a group, as 
will  often  be  the  case  with  associations  like  clubs  or  trade 
unions”  (Harris  1996:  101).  Corporations  are  usually 
characterised  by  a  separation  of  the  use-control  and  wealth-
allocation functions of property (or the “separation of control and 
ownership” in Berle and Means terms (1947: 93)). Shareholders, 
for example, have the right to a share of the wealth effects, yet 
cannot  usually expect  a right  to make use of corporate assets. 
Whatever the internal organisation actually looks like however, 
Harris  writes  that  “those  who  exercise  control  are  free  ...  to 
justify  their  actions  on  the  grounds  that  they  are  in  the  self-
seeking interests of their members or shareholders. In the case of 
these [joint]  variants,  as  in that  of  individual  private property, 
ownership interests serve as irreducible organizing ideas between 
desire and authorized choice” (Harris 1996: 102).
54 He admits that certain uses of the resource might be banned to all, but this 
would have to be by property-independent prohibitions,  such as through 
taboos. Any rule that may govern the particular resource in question would 
have to be free from proprietary presuppositions, that is it cannot assume 
any ownership interest whatsoever: “[i]f property is ‘common’, no man may 
say you nay because the thing is his” (Harris 1996: 109). 
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Public  (or  state)  property,  according  to  Harris  and  mirroring 
Waldron’s account, is characterised by quasi-ownership interests. 
Those agencies vested with certain use-privileges  and control-
powers are not at liberty to exploit these for their own benefit, 
that  is,  they  lack  authorised  self-seekingness.  Instead,  the 
exploitation of their powers can only be justified by reference to 
the  particular  public  purpose  for  which  the  agency  has  been 
vested  with  these  powers  in  the  first  place.  For  example,  by 
reference  to  the  public  interest  in  terms  of  the  park  (as  is 
reflected in Illustration 5). Public property is hence, for Harris, a 
quasi-property, an aberrant form of dominion.
Harris  contrasts  communitarian  property  with  public  property 
and joint  forms of  private  property:  “a  spontaneously evolved 
category  of  property  holding  which  has  been  of  the  greatest 
historical  significance,  but  which,  for  better  or  for  worse,  has 
been  largely  eclipsed  in  modern  society”  (Harris  1996:  103). 
“Communitarian property” in his sense, refers to a wide range of 
land-holding arrangements, the particular specifications of which 
depend on social, economic and spiritual variables, and are only 
conceptually  united  by  their  negative  contrast  with  private 
property. He explains:
“‘[C]ommunitarian property’ refers to a situation in 
which  a  community  of  persons  has  the  following 
relationship to a resource, usually land. They have 
the benefit of trespassory rules excluding outsiders 
from the resource – in that sense it is their private 
property.  However  whatever  powers  of  internal 
division or transmission they possess are referable, 
not  to  the  wider  institution  which  contains  the 
trespassory  rules  that  confer  protection  against 
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outsiders,  but  to  internal  regulations  arising  from 
their  mutual  sense  of  community”  (Harris  1996: 
103).
While  communitarian  property  is  accorded  trespassory 
protection,  “it  carries  no  connotation  of  open-ended  self-
regarding  exploitation”  (Harris  1996:  104).  In  that  sense,  it 
resembles  public  property.  However,  particular  uses  that  are 
made of the resource do not have to be justified by reference to 
any particular  purpose  that  is  external  to  the  community.  The 
community does not have to defer to any exogenous regulations 
with  regard  to  the  internal  distribution  of  use-privileges  and 
control-powers.  In  that  sense,  it  resembles  private  property.  A 
crucial  difference  between  joint  private  property  and 
communitarian property, on Harris’s account, is that the former is 
an institution of and in existing legal systems, while the latter is 
not – even though legal systems might recognise communitarian 
property (for example in the form of indigenous title to land) as 
some kind of special, though probably defeasible interest55.
55 Harris refers to a decision of the High Court of Australia in Mabo v. State of  
Queensland (No. 2) 1992, 175 CLR 1, which ruled that “the ‘radical title’ to  
land acquired by the Crown on settlement was burdened with the ‘native 
title’ of any aboriginal … group … for so long as its descendants remained 
in  occupation  and  until  native  title  was  effectively  extinguished  by 
legislation or exercise of executive power, or surrendered to the Crown. So 
long as it persisted, the community’s native title was subject to appropriate 
legal  protection  against  all  the  world.  All  questions  as  to  the  rights  of  
individual  members  of  the  community  over  their  land  were  to  be 
determined,  as  questions of  fact,  by reference to  the particular  evolving 
traditions of the group.  It  was not  requisite to show that,  internally,  the 
members viewed their relationship to the land as an ‘ownership’ interest, in  
any way comparable to the range of ownership interests known to modern 
legal systems” (Harris 1996: 103).
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Harris’s classifications are very useful in understanding the way 
in which most contemporary legal systems actually function with 
regard to questions of property.  However, as noted previously, 
while the open-ended powers authorising self-seekingness which 
obtain over “lumps” of social wealth (Harris 1996: 138)  indeed 
characterise the landscape of capitalist nation states, there is of 
course  no  reason  for  them  to  have  to do  so.  And  this  is  so 
whether  or  not private  property  is  logically  prior  to  any 
conception of “common property”, as Harris incessantly argues.
For  our  purposes,  his  conception  of  communitarian  property 
warrants special attention. It is characterised by a clear sense of 
communal  autonomy  from  the  greater  totality  of  which  it  is 
nonetheless a part. Let me repeat his words again here:
“[W]hatever  powers  of  internal  division  or 
transmission they possess are referable,  not  to the 
wider  institution  which  contains  the  trespassory 
rules that confer protection against outsiders, but to 
internal regulations arising from their mutual sense 
of community” (Harris 1996: 103).
Moreover, it  is characterised by diversity in its manifestations, 
and an independence (another autonomy) of the  only institution 
of property that Harris recognises as proper property:
“The social, ethical, and spiritual bonds which unite 
a spontaneously-evolved community to the resource 
it  collectively  claims  for  its  own  are  infinitely 
variable.  In  the  absence  of  private  property 
institutions,  that  variable  relationship  has  its 
normative force independently of any conception of 
property whatever” (Harris 1996: 117).
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I  proposed  a  framework  that  seeks  to  understand  property  as 
structuring the social relations with regard to things that give rise 
to  a  community,  and  that  illuminates  the  constitution  of  a 
relating-subject through its particular interactions with regard to 
a  related-to  object.  Given this  framework, we  can  understand 
communitarian  property  as  the  autonomous  constitution  of  a  
commons based on the articulation of common values in the form  
of property protocols.
2.6.4 Commoning as autonomous property configuration.
Let me conclude (for  now) that  the conventional  accounts  we 
encountered  so  far  can  be  summarised  as  all  explaining  and 
classifying  different  forms  of  property  according  to  particular 
configurations of (i) the distribution of decision-making authority 
(regarding what use can be made of something and by whom, 
including wealth effects, and the trespassory rules that stabilise 
this  distribution);  and  (ii)  that  by  reference  to  which  these 
decisions  are  made  legitimate  (whim  or  self-seekingness, 
“public” or “social” interest, spontaneously evolved community 
values).
We might summarise this further as (i) who decides about what? 
and  (ii)  how? And  we  might  map  these  concerns  onto  our 
original  diagram.  Self-seekingness  or  social  interest  are 
encompassed by the question of how decisions are justified. And 
justifications always happen, even if tacitly, in common. If most 
people respect the boundaries that private property draws, and if 
those that do not are being publicly penalised, then the idea of 
self-referential decision-making authority is, at least to a certain 
degree, a  common value. Control power is encompassed by the 
question of who can make decisions about what can be done with 
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something.  Are  individuals  or  groups  of  individuals  assigned 
sovereignty over different things? Who has to be involved in the 
decision-making process for it to be legitimate? Do I need to ask 
someone before I hurl the plate I eat from against the wall? Do I 
need to ask someone before I cut down trees to build a parking 
lot? Access and use are encompassed by the question of  what 
can be done  with the resource in question. We have discussed 
above that, as human beings, we do not only do things, we do 
things with things. The decision-making power that characterises 
property is hence about enabling and constraining action. And as 
action also always involves an agent, this power is also obviously 
about people.
Illustration 6: Elementary questions of property.
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Autonomy,  in  the  sense  of  Harris’s  communitarian  property 
holders,  I  maintain,  is  the background upon which answers to 
these primary questions are configured, and which provides the 
background values  by reference  to  which these  configurations 
gain their meaning (and legitimacy). And this is not only so for 
the  kind  of  communities  that  hold  communitarian  property  in 
Harris’s terms, but for any kind of social totality (what we have 
been  calling  the  relating-subject  or  A+C).  Autonomy  is  not 
primarily  freedom-from something or other,  but  the  freedom-to 
collectively  self-constitute.  Those  who  can  collectively  self-
constitute  form autonomous communities.  Commoning is  such 
collective self-constitution, commoning is creating autonomy. It 
is in the process of self-constitution that a certain kind of force of 
law is unleashed which binds the collective together. What binds 
us together  is our common values, emerging, as they do, from 
common action, co-habitation, communication, sociality. And it 
is  from  the  collectivity  that  answers  to  how,  who  and  what 
emerge, are contested, entrenched and overthrown.
Does this mean, then, that capitalist democracies are autonomous 
commons?  In  some  ways,  it  is  instructive  to  see  all  social 
totalities as commoning. I have noted a few times already that 
there are important ways in which capitalist societies do indeed 
also  constitute  commons,  with  shared  values  and  common (if 
fragmenting) practices and relationships.
However, there is a distinction that I would like to make lest I 
stretch the concept of commons too far for it to be useful for my 
anti-capitalist purposes. The distinction is based on Linebaugh’s 
thesis of the difference between individual rights and rights of 
commoning.  And  also  reflects  Harris’s  insight  that  “social, 
ethical,  and  spiritual  bonds  ...  unite  a  spontaneously-evolved 
community  to  the  resource  it  collectively  claims  for  its  own” 
(1996: 117).
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In  the  introduction  we  introduced  a  distinction  between 
individual  rights,  invested  in  individuals,  and  rights  of 
commoning  that  was  reflected  in  the  principle  differences 
between,  on  the  one  hand,  The  American  Declaration  of 
Independence, and  the  Magna Carta and the Charter  of Forest 
(the Great Charters) on the other. 
The  former  revolves  around  the  individual's  right  to  private 
property, while the latter take as a starting point “a world of use 
values” (Linebaugh 2008: 42-43) and are  “independent … of the 
state and the temporality of the law and state” (ibid: 45). Rights 
of commoning, for Linebaugh, reflect “a natural attitude” - it is 
not the self-referential, individual will that decides on action in 
isolation from the environment and the community in which it is 
embedded.
The configuration of control powers (who makes the decisions) 
and  use  privileges  (what  actions  are  enabled  or  constrained) 
emerges  through  a  collective  labour  process,  and  is  not 
sanctioned nor enforced by the state, but lived and negotiated in 
common (Linebaugh 2008: 45). 
Conversely,  The  American  Declaration  of  Independence 
articulates the right to private property, projecting the monarch 
into  the  individual,  thereby  instantiating  and  valuing  self-
referential  legitimacy (of  course  not  always a  bad thing),  and 
justifying the state insofar as it upholds these individual rights. 
The  commoner's  body  is  autonomous  from  the  state,  her 
privileges and powers, rights and duties are laid upon the land 
and emerge and are reproduced through social interaction. 
This  nature  of  the  rights  of  commoning  distinguishes  them 
radically from liberal logics of private property, which proceed 
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from assumptions about a sovereign individual whose autonomy 
can be interpreted, in an ironical reversal, as a fiction that serves 
to  legitimate  the  state.  The  common  value  associated  with 
capitalist  private  property  lies  in  a  moment  of  creation  of  
separation,  and  the  common  value  is  thus  expressed  by  all 
remaining sovereigns in their individual realms. The message of 
this value is that no further common values are necessary: the 
sum of market agency will deliver the common good. That it is 
sufficient  for  achieving  commonalty,  then,  is  the  core  value 
encoded in capitalist property. 
Commoning, on the other hand, is the collective performing of 
actions involving the use of things. It is collective not insofar as 
it  is  always performed  together,  but  insofar as it  is  guided by 
norms and values  that  are  common.  It  is  not  about  everybody 
working on the field, or on a software project  at the same time 
(even though it sometimes will be). Rather it is about building 
relationships to one another through  the attention to  a common 
field  or  a  software  project,  that  is,  through the  attention  to  a 
common resource which enables and sustains both collective and 
individual projects. It is in the shared attention that is paid to a 
resource that the commoners’ relationships are formed. And the 
forming  of  relationships  is  also  the  forming  of  values  –  the 
learning  of  a  common language.  In  this  sense,  commoning is 
recursive: it both makes and is made by shared values.
Care, we might say, lies at the heart of the decisions that need to 
be made with regard to a commons.  In  commoning,  it  is  less 
about  who has  the  power  to  make  decisions,  and  more  about 
which decisions are actually made. Decisions are legitimised by 
the shared values they embody (if they do) rather than by whom 
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they were made56. The primacy of identity (in the birth certificate 
kind of sense) is eclipsed by the primacy of action in the question 
of  who  makes  authorised  decisions  and  who  has  authorised 
access. The elements of property (use-privileges, control power, 
that which legitimises control power, trespassory rules) are still 
the  same,  but  their  different  configurations  give  rise  to 
qualitatively different social relations with regard to things.
2.7 Concluding Remarks.  
As a technical code for the commodity form, private property has 
proven  very  powerful.  As  such,  it  has  colonised  our 
understanding of social relations with regard to things. Indeed, 
we have become objects ourselves, as captured in Marx’s concept 
of  alienated  labour  or  the  management  concept  of  “human 
resources”.  However,  as  argued  in  the  Introduction,  freeing 
ourselves  from  the  commodity  form  does  not  mean  freeing 
ourselves from “the thing”. As a matter of fact, it seems entirely 
unlikely that we would at all be able to free ourselves from the 
commodity form, deeply ingrained in our psyche as it is, without 
a  foregrounding of  the  role of things in  social  relations.  Such 
foregrounding of  the  thing  in  order  to  escape  the  commodity 
form would be expressive of self-articulated needs and desires 
and be sensitive to its social and environmental setting.
56 This is not to say that power and identity are absent in the commons. In the 
context of the Linux kernel, which is a central Free Software project, it has 
been noted that the organisational mode is meritocracy (Moody 2001). This 
means that it often matters after all by whom decisions are made. However, 
this power to decide is closely associated with how well a person embodies 
the central values of the commons in her actions.
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Understanding property primarily as social relations opens up to 
a  possible  critique of  property that  goes  far  beyond the usual 
arguments regarding the justifiable reach of private property, or 
the exact conditions that make up property rights.  By taking a 
social relations view, the way in which property protocols shape 
entire  communities  moves  into  the  foreground.  The  focus  on 
entire  communities  brings  questions  of  the  ends  of  social 
organisation,  which  the  hegemony  of  the  economistic  view 
suppressed,  back  into  discussion.  Correspondingly,  the 
possibility  of  constituting  commons  through an articulation  of 
property relations into property protocols becomes more visible. 
Such articulation can be based on actually practised relations or 
on normative judgements about which kinds of practices would 
help constitute the kind of commons people would like to create.
I set out to provide a minimalist framework for a social analysis  
of property that could facilitate  processes of self-articulation of 
relational modalities through which commons can autonomously  
constitute themselves. The framework can moreover be used for 
re-articulations  of  the  private  property  rights  through  which 
exclusive control  of  the  land,  its  resources,  and the means  of 
production and distribution is sanctioned. My purpose has been 
to deconstruct and destabilise property,  reveal its  anatomy and 
operationalise it to open ends.  Property provides answers to the 
question of who makes (or can make) decisions over the actions 
of people with regard to things, and by reference to what these 
decisions are legitimised. But can the commons, even if it finds 
its  own  answers  to  these  questions,  constitute  itself  under 
capitalist democracy?
Commons  always  generate  their  own  property  protocols. 
Commoning is acting together in a world full of things, and full  
of  life  which is  dependent  on things.  Values  which guide this 
action will always be present, and will inform the practice of the 
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commons. To articulate these values into property protocols is a 
form  of  reflexive  self-constitution.  The  important  question  is 
now  how  to  articulate  them  within  the  setting  of  capitalist 
democracy. 
Free Software, I argue, is an example of how a (very capitalist) 
private  property  protocol  (namely,  copyright)  was  cleverly 
reconfigured to instantiate and protect the commoning practices 
of hackers. As we will see in more detail in the next chapter, the 
Free Software commons relies on the decision-making power it 
has been granted through copyright, using it to provide freedoms 
for all in perpetuity.
It is not my intention to suggest that adopting the Free Software 
model is possible in exactly the same way  outside the realm of 
copyright.  Research  on  the  legal  particularities  of  different 
property  rights  would  be  necessary,  and  might  vary  between 
jurisdictions57.  However,  articulating  the  property  protocols  of 
Free  Software  will  inscribe  upon  the  theoretical  province  of  
property  the  relational  modalities  of  Free  Software,  thereby 
enriching this province.
Moreover,  by articulating their  property protocols,  many other 
commons  could  also  contribute  to  an  even  more  fine-grained 
understanding  of  the  possibilities  of  property.  Every  time  a 
commons  inscribes  itself  upon  property  the  conceptual 
framework  is  enlarged,  as  new  tools  and  perspectives  for 
property  analyses  become  available.  The  picture  is  enriched 
through new ideas for relational modalities, ways of constituting 
57 The work of  the P2P Foundation  –  led  by  Michel  Bauwens  –  is  doing 
pioneering work with regard to the translation of Free Software and related  
cyberspace principles into other domains. See http://p2pfoundation.net/.
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the  relating  subject,  classifying  the  related-to  object and 
whatever else can be imagined. 
As  long  as  the  end of  the  commons  –  the  continued  mutual 
articulation  of  the  many  yeses  -  is  also  the  means of  the 
commons,  autonomy  based  on  action  and  relationships  has 
eclipsed the commodity form as a guiding principle of building 
social  relations.  The  commons  conceived  in  this  way  is  a 
realisation of the politics of the meaning of life, and suggestive 
of social organisation beyond the nation state. The commons is a 
lived resistance: if there is any exit at all from capital, it lies in  
the subversion of property frameworks through the inscription of 
the relational modalities of the multitude of commons upon it.
Let us finally investigate the Free Software commons in detail to 
investigate  its  technical  foundation,  history  of  resistance, 
community building practices, and, of course, property relations.
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